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Abstract
If consideration is given to math’s look when it is written out, math can be experienced
visually without working with or understanding its logical content. This “meaningless
math” then becomes a vessel into which new contextual meaning is injected by a given
observer. “The look of math” is a part o f ethnomathematics, or the culture of
mathematics, which necessarily and anti-Platonically (i.e., taking math to be purely a
human endeavor) contains mathematics per se. Formal elements in math-as-art can be
categorized as algebraic, geometric, diagrammatic, or organic. The main idea is not
“math can be art,” but rather that math has a look, which is not the same thing as math’s
inner structure, and which is exploitable in nonmathematical ways. However, math has
special properties that amplify its importance as some specific thing that has rarely been
isolated and defined as art, thereby granting math potential for contribution to art.
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Introduction
“Chess players are madmen o f a certain quality; the way the artist is supposed to be, and
isn’t, in general.” - Marcel Duchamp

Duchamp' (1887 - 1968) was perhaps the only historically important artist
concerned with math , in and of itself. Many artists used math as a tool or reference to
help develop their works, but Duchamp was quite unique in that he looked directly at its
nature and structure, and made it the subject of some o f his creative explorations. His
-3

career as an artist ended in 1918 , when he moved from New York to Buenos Aires and
started playing chess, attaining mastery of the game and continuing with it until his
death4.

The quote at the top o f the page is taken from an interview given by journalist and
art critic Pierre Cabanne5, published in 1967, one year before Duchamp’s death. In the
interview, Cabanne asks Duchamp about chess, and if playing chess was a more
satisfying form o f personal expression than art; Duchamp answers, “Yes, perhaps.”
Earlier in his life, though long after he had replaced art with chess (and in fact after he
had realized that his talents at chess were probably not going to develop any further),
Duchamp said, “I am still a victim o f chess. It has all the beauty of art - and much more.
It cannot be commercialized. Chess is much purer than art in its social position.” When
Duchamp gave his quotable response about art, madmen, and chess, he inferred that all of
the qualities he felt were missing from art and the art world were present in chess. Chess,
for Duchamp, had a purity, passion, and incorruptibility that made it an attractive and
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worthwhile pursuit, one that stood in contrast to the environment with which Duchamp
had become dissatisfied.
Moving from chess to math is easy. Like math, chess is concerned with logical
processes and structures that are demonstrated and displayed with an inherent visuality6;
just as the living logic o f a chess game is communicated to us with a particular layout of
pieces on the board, the living logic of mathematics is communicated to us with Greek,
Arabic, and Roman symbols. Qualities o f chess that appealed to Duchamp - purity,
passion, resistance to commercialization - are found in pure mathematics. Although my
research is not about pure mathematics per se, it is about a ghost of pure mathematics,
mathematics-under-glass, or a mathematical Shroud of Turin . Similarly to the way
Duchamp saw chess as a way to rejuvenate creative practice, part o f my hypothesis is that
math, and more specifically the visual culture of math, contains unrealized and
revitalizing potential for art. Preceding that assertion is the other part o f my hypothesis:
that math exists in a two-part structure (visuality and intemalities), which can be
separated, like blood or cream.
o

The look o f math - its symbols and diagrams - is “significant in its form” as an
archive o f cultural production. This look of math, or visuality of math, can function as a
source o f artistic material, or can be regarded as artistic material in and o f itself, apart
from the logical intemalities of the mathematics with which it engages. This line
(between math regarded as artistic material in and o f itself and art based on the logical
intemalities o f mathematics) needs to be drawn because there is a well-established
tradition of art generated from mathematics; for example, the drawings of M. C. Escher9,
and various sorts of formalist and logical, pattern-based works that use math in the
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creation o f those forms, including African fractals and contemporary computer-generated
artwork10.
The focus of my study does not relate to these latter examples, on what is usually
thought o f as “mathematics in art,” but rather focuses on something like mathematical
residue - the symbology that would remain on a paper or blackboard if the internal
mathematical logic could be taken away. This external or superficial beauty enjoys a
complex and peripheral relationship with what mathematicians call “mathematical
beauty.” It is notable that classically-termed “mathematical beauty” may actually be a
combination o f visuality and something like symmetry, completion, logical puzzle
solving - the meshing of mathematical intemalities, or a “light bulb flash of
understanding.”11 As I detail later on, it is especially noteworthy that a great many perhaps even a majority - of examples o f “mathematical beauty” presented to a lay
audience are presented only when accompanied with some compelling visualization o f
the mathematics at hand. The reason for this might be that writers and publishers do not
trust their readers to associate “the beautiful” with logical math statements, and think
those readers need to be helped along into an aesthetic mindset with a “pretty picture.” It
might also be that mathematicians and math writers themselves have misappropriated the
word “beauty” and are using it incorrectly or too loosely. Mathematical beauty, in spite of
its textbook definition, often seems dependent on visual aesthetics, at least as it is usually
demonstrated.
My explorations in this paper and in my studio research are about math as art, as
opposed to math in art. I consider the visuality o f mathematics - the way mathematics
looks, as opposed to how it is. It is this superficiality with which I am concerned in terms
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o f my studio work and my academic research. That is not to say “superficiality” in the
sense o f being shallow or trite, but regarding what the term denotes: concern with surface
meaning.

This is a Saussurean project in that it is concerned with a two-part structure of
some superficial indicative representative (sign), and some “deeper,” more substantial
object to which the sign refers. With this in mind, it would be helpful to go into a small
amount o f detail about Ferdinand de Saussure’s semiotics and how his posited objectarchetypes or containers relate and correspond to the objects of (and objects in)
mathematics, ethnomathematics, and the look o f math, and the way I am attempting to
use the objects in this intellectual undertaking.
Saussure, in his influential and seminal work Course in General Linguistics' 2,
mapped out in some detail (and from a particular philosophical perspective) the way
visual, auditory, or other symbols work to represent objects in human consciousness,
communication, and information retrieval. Saussure saw semiotics as a dyadic, or twopart structure: a given sign is split into a signifier (the form the sign takes), and the
signified (the concept or cognitive structure the sign takes in the mind as it is mapped to
object, or referent). For example, the ink or pencil mark “2” on a page or chalkboard
would constitute the signifier. Then, under normal circumstances and use, the subsequent
cognitive task would be to map this particular visual shape, this recognizable and
categorizable image, to a mental structure of “2,” which is ontologically similar to an
ultimate referent-object o f “math.” In fact, in the case o f math or other abstract objects
(justice, God, love, etc), it becomes difficult to parse a difference between the mental
object “signified” and some external object “referent.” So, in these cases it can be useful
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for me to discard some distinctions, and simplify the Saussurean semiotic structure: all
that is needed here, in terms o f my project, is a sign or signifier, and then a signified or
referent. I am treating “math” as an abstract mental object, and it is not necessary to
extract another mental object from it and then apply a label to it; this is redundant.
Mathematics is built from a two-part structure: an internal logical meaning, and
those visual symbols that convey this meaning. If internal logical meaning is lifted out
from “underneath” the symbols, then the meaning that remains is purely
ethnomathematical - concerned with the surrounding (or inherent) culture of math. The
visuality o f the math that remains, that which creates artistic/aesthetic meaning/presence
for an observer, exists because o f the cultural content that is left over once the logical
intemalities o f the mathematics are removed. In other words, there is some meaning left
there that is o f a cultural or ethnological nature, which will o f course vary in its particular
flavor depending on the observer’s personal, emotional relationship with the
mathematical artifacts - which might range anywhere from comfort to fear to disinterest
to disgust - or to any number of conceivable human emotions. Mathematics often elicits
strong emotions in people, perhaps because o f early childhood exposure along with the
associated expectations and assertions o f society (“You must learn this,” “You must use
this,” and perhaps most importantly “You are not smart unless you can do this”). My
research is concerned with the potency o f this emotional connection with the visual
artifacts o f math, as well as what that connection’s variable nature can tell us about
society and culture, both including and beyond the context o f visual art.
For the purposes o f my study, I define ethnomathematics as the doing of math, by
people; this could be argued to amount to the creation of a visual culture through

behavior. In the sections that follow, I will expand on ideas regarding ethnomathematics
and representation as they pertain to the phenomenology of visual culture, and then use
specific examples from mathematics and art to demonstrate my hypothesis: that in the
“pencil-work” o f math resides harvestable material for art and visual culture, a resource
that has, for the most part, been left unexploited by artists.

\
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Ethnomathematics
Defining “ethnomathematics” would be less problematic if the word did not have
a few different meanings. That is to say, the definitional issue is not one generated by
complexity or opacity o f semantics, but rather by disagreement regarding which
relatively straightforward meaning to use.13 From contemporary usage, three basic
definitions describing “ethnomathematics” can be lifted out and categorized: 1) it
involves the embedding of math in different social activities,14 2) it is any non-Westem
system o f mathematics15, and 3) it involves a broader reflection on the sociology of
mathematics such that the focus is on a cultural context for mathematics16. The first and
third definitions are related, although are not precisely the same; the first has a more
practical, less theoretical, and somewhat more scientific quality. While I do not want to
ignore or pass over the value o f this sort o f practicality and the kinds of useful examples
it demonstrates, my focus in terms o f art and culture benefits more from a definition that
is not so prone to a reduction to a set o f lists or examples. So, it is the third definition on
which I will focus, for the purposes o f my research into the relationship between “the
visual” and mathematics within an anthropological context17. The second definition gives
•

#
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rise to political discourse , which is an important consideration, but one that does not
directly pertain to visual culture and its relationship with mathematics.
The concept of math being contained within a culture is problematic for many
people, possibly because math takes on, for perhaps that same set of “many people,” a
universal, almost Platonic19 set o f imagined qualities. The perception of these is,
ironically enough, based as much on the cultural perception and social location of
mathematics as it is based on any innate or inherent structures. But, in fact, a culture of

math must exist; to suppose that it does not exist is to imply that math has nothing to do
with human activity. Partly, this resistance to ethnomathematics as a legitimately extant
thing has to do with a sort o f kulturkampf20 - a Derridean binary, perhaps - between two
real or imagined intellectual camps: we can call one arts, humanities, the textual
disciplines, etc., and we can call the other science, technology, engineering, mathematics
- sometimes represented by the acronym “STEM” by entities like the National Science
Foundation and the United States Department of Labor21 (and often in the context of
certain sociopolitical questions, such as the concern over the relative lack o f women and
minorities in STEM fields). Basically, the former appears concerned with a rightbrained

approach to analysis in which meaning is imprecise, while the other takes a left-

brained approach, employing precise categorical boundaries. This is a reductionist
description o f what is, to begin with, a reductionist world-view (and furthermore one that
does not necessarily reflect any real political structures of any importance in a
contemporary intellectual setting), but it sketches a germane idea.
In light o f the foregoing, it is worth recalling that in 1996, Professor Alan Sokal
o f New York University (in)famously submitted an article to a John’s Hopkins University
cultural studies journal. His article asserted that quantum gravity23 is a social construct,
and by strong implication that a scientifically observable, objective reality cannot and
does not exist. The journal, “Social Text,” published Sokal’s article, and Sokal shortly
thereafter revealed it to be a prank intended to shed light on sloppy intellectualism and
scholarship in the humanities. The fallout from the affair included questions on peer
review, academic dishonesty, as well as a deeper issue of the humanities’ contemporary
hero-worship of the sciences, as a manifestation o f the latter’s elevation over the first,
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socio-politically speaking. The Sokal Hoax, or Sokal Affair24, was an iconic and
somewhat paparazzi manifestation of the problems whereby the purported two
intellectual camps are increasingly, especially in the past 20 years, at odds with one
another.
Ethnography, anthropology, sociology - these are all placed in one camp, while
math is placed in the other. When the first camp is perceived as encroaching on the
second (the root issue that gave the Sokal Affair so much publicity and seeming cultural
importance), the conflict between these two elements of the Derridean binary is brought
to a head. And true to the form of a Derridean binary, the Sokal Affair demonstrated the
“higher” political locus o f one element over the other25.
Interestingly enough, however, science/math/tech was not always considered
culturally “superior” to arts/humanities/text; in Essays on Mysticism, published in 1910,
Bertrand Russell mentions that culture studies, history, literature, etc, are taken to be at a
higher social location than the technical pursuits o f his day. Without delving too deeply
into this (which threatens to become a tangential discussion), I would posit that the
reason for this shift has mostly to do with World War II, the Cold War (including the
Space Race), and the emphasis on industry and production o f the military and scientific
materials and equipment these events engendered. It is interesting (and comforting to a
student o f the arts) to know that this world-view was not always in place, and that
perhaps university humanities departments were not always as endangered as they are
today in a climate o f business, militarism, engineering, and the now-familiar chimera o f
the three.
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Returning to the need to locate my definition o f ethnomathematics, some o f the
resistance to the concept comes from the kind o f split in intellectual consciousness that I
have been discussing, as well as from a haughtiness that stems from the requirements of
the military-industrial complex. Arguably, the study of science and technology has been
co-opted not only by the “irrational rationality o f Capitalism26,” as Michel Foucault put
it, but also by the demands of empire.
In science, ideally the process o f knowledge acquisition is driven by the scientific
method, which is in theory an open process based on experimentation, observation,
measurement, and documentation. However, in practice, and especially for lay people,
scientific fact is more akin to priestly authority in that it is largely inscrutable, and most
lay people do not have the intellectual or research tools to challenge it. Furthermore, in
practice, the acceptance of dogma seeps into the professional field as well, often simply
for practical reasons; it is impossible to ask “why?” about every conclusion presented in
the annals o f science - there isn’t time. So, a “life o f science” is never going to be wholly
about experimentation and discovery; in spite of the existence of rhetoric about the open
process o f science, some progress within the field will always come out of creed and
dogma. In theory, this does not need to remain true; anyone can do their own
experimentation and make their own observations to refute mainline scientific consensus,
but in practice it is not feasible to do so due to the size o f the body of knowledge that is
being dealt with and built upon, as well as the complexity o f the experimentation
required. So, much scientific knowledge comes to scientists in a similar way that creed is
passed on by religious authorities and through religious texts.
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Mathematics is different than experimental science in this respect. For one thing,
one does not need expensive tools to do math. Therefore some potential exists for the lay
individual to challenge a public and consensus-based doctrine o f “mathematical truth,”
something which happens not-infirequently; mathematics has a long tradition of a sort of
“amateurism” where people with little exposure to a containing culture, or who are not
institutionalized or affiliated, make significant contributions to the field, in the manner of
Einstein27 or Perelman28.

Math is called “The Queen o f Sciences,” because it is the language with which the
experimental sciences operate in their ongoing tasks o f observation, measurement, and
comparison. These tasks require precision, exactitude, and repeatability, which are
abilities mathematics can lend them. But “The Queen o f Sciences” is a misleading label,
because mathematics is different from experimental science in important ways: 1) it
constitutes a creative process, 2) it is less dependent on dogmatic authority, and (most
central to my scholarship) 3) mathematics is different from experimental science in that it
is inherently visual - a record o f the cultural act o f doing math is produced every time
these tools are used. From that, and apart from the internal logic o f math that is
responsible for its use in science and engineering, comes “the look o f math.”
Simply stated and from my perspective, ethnomathematics is the human act o f
doing math, as well as all the patterns, behavior, and visuality that result from it, which depending on your philosophical position vis-à-vis Platonism and the Realm of Ideas as it
relates to mathematics - might or might not be a different thing than mathematics itself.
So, the problematic o f defining ethnomath goes deeper than the aforementioned rightbrain vs. left-brain intellectual kulturkampf - indeed, it is a problem that harkens to one

o f the oldest discourses in the history o f philosophy: realism (math as discoverable
object) vs. anti-realism (math as created object).
Along with “doing math,” ethnomath comprises “looking at math.” Any time a
human does something, that human is engaging in culture, and is in fact creating culture.
Culture can be seen as the sum total of human behavior, although that seems to bring the
discussion into the domain of psychology. To expand on this definition, one might
imagine patterns in human activity, such that they can be repeated. Certainly, even if one
were a strict Platonist-bordering-on-Pythagorean who believes math to be something that
has a life o f its own, that exists totally apart from human thought, behavior, and culture,
such a fundamentalist thinker would still have to admit that math is something that people
do.
To prove this, write down a problem: “4x + 4 = 2, solve for x”, then solve it
algebraically as you were probably taught to do at 12 or 13 years old. That process of
solution seeking involves a human being doing math, and is therefore ethnomathematical
in nature. In fact, to take our example o f that simple algebraic equation further, we can
imagine a class o f 13 year olds all doing the same problem, in a classroom, with all of its
conventions and codes o f behavior: the particular way the equation is solved, by “doing
the same thing to each side,” in particular steps, and even the variable used (“x” instead
o f “a” or “b”) and the Arabic numerals are all parts o f ethnomathematics - certainly no
one in a right and reflective mind would argue that the same logical concepts o f algebraic
substitution could not be accomplished with different symbols.
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To answer the question “What differentiates ethnomathematics from
mathematics?”, we have to assume one of two philosophical positions, and then give one
o f two possible answers. If we are mathematical anti-realists29, also referred to as
mathematical anti-Platonists - that is to say we believe math is nothing apart from that
which is created by human beings - then our answer verges on “Nothing; there is no
difference,” since m ath’s inability to exist apart from human activity turns
ethnomathematics into a sort o f absolute unto itself. However, if we are mathematical
realists or a mathematical Platonists, such that we believe math is a universal thing that
exists whether humans are involved in it or not, then the answer is “There is a difference
- math per se is not the same thing as doing math.'’'’ In this case, the object of “math,” as it
is Platonically imagined, does not necessarily have anything to do with the human act of
doing math, which in this case is taken to be something like discovery or even spiritual
revelation o f some sort o f universal or divine truth.
And “divine truth” is what math was taken to be in the time of Pythagoras and in
the time o f Plato , with Pythagoras going so far as to implement a religious cult around
mathematical and especially geometric absolutes. For Pythagoras, math was divine; it
was the language o f the Gods. And Pythagoras influenced Plato, notably in his ideas that
mathematics can form the basis o f a universal truth or ideal31.
Different sorts of contemporary mathematicians might answer the question of
whether or not math is a Platonic ideal differently. First, consider mathematical physics,
which is concerned with quantum and particle behavior illustrated in theoretical models.32
For mathematicians in this field, math is being used to describe particularities within our
own universe - physical realities that do not necessarily have counterparts in all of

existence; a mathematical physicist might thereby come to see math as an anti-realist
construct, or something that is wholly human-created. However, in a very abstracted field
like category theory , which is based on the articulating or demonstrating of the
relationships between mathematical objects without necessarily going into any detail
about the properties o f the objects themselves, the math has no reference point to a
physics or set o f natural laws that is uncertain to exist in any “reality;” it is therefore
multi-universally true that any number o f extra-dimensional civilizations would be likely
to invent the same “category theory.” So, to a category theorist, math might seem more
like a Platonic ideal: a universal that supersedes human creativity, or even a discoverable
object.
The question o f whether math is created or math is discovered is philosophical,
and open-ended. Although mathematical realism and ethnomathematics are connected,
they do not enjoy a logical relationship such that some particular position (notably, that
o f the mathematical anti-realist who might be inclined to assert that ethnomathematics
and mathematics are not significantly different things) will cancel out the existence of
ethnomath. Perhaps our discussion regarding mathematical realism may broaden or
narrow the scope o f ethnomath or make it indistinguishable from math per se (that is to
say, innate logical structures), but such conjecture is still not able to extinguish
ethnomathematics as a term altogether for one simple reason: people do math, read math,
and maintain a working relationship with math within which behavioral norms are
established. A culture o f math is a necessary thing, its existence just as tautological as the
existence o f a culture o f religion. As an anthropologist might study the culture o f some
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facet of a particular society - marriage customs, sexual morality, funerary practice, etc. so he or she might study the culture o f mathematics.
“Pure mathematics” is a particular facet o f that refers to math that is pursued and
done for its own sake, without any desired or foreseen application34.1 bring up this
distinction for two reasons. Firstly, as I pointed out above, it should be noted that some
branches o f mathematics lend themselves to an anti-realist world view, while others lend
themselves to a realist world view, depending on whether their work appears to be related
to physical or natural phenomena, or if the mathematical work is abstract enough to
constitute sufficiently generalized categories and objects to sever any connection which
that mathematics might have to the natural world. Secondly, I bring it up because “pure
mathematics,” and the distinction between “applied math” and “pure math” is an
o r

ethnomathematical distinction . The philosopher and mathematician Bertrand Russel, in
his Mysticism and Logic, tells us that pure mathematics was invented or discovered by
Boole in 1854, and “consists entirely o f assertions to the effect that, if such and such a
proposition is true o f anything, then such and such another proposition is true of that
thing.” In general words, pure mathematics is a philosophical system based around
formal logic, that stands in contrast to the real-world problem-solving tools o f applied
math.
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Deeper Into Math
The distinction between math-in-art and math-as-art is important. Math-in-art, as I
have stated, is art where math is used to generate the artwork, where the logic and
operation o f mathematics is seen as functioning in a “classically mathematical” way.
Good examples are the work o f M. C. Escher in which geometric forms are precisely
interlaid, and contemporary computer art that makes use o f the computational ability o f a
microprocessor to calculate visual geometric relationships that would be challenging or
impossible to do by hand.
Diagrammatic Morphisms36, a kind o f string diagram used in contemporary
topology (and which I use in my own artwork), are a borderline-case, although less of
one than they might appear to be, once one understands the nature o f morphisms. This
begins to move uncomfortably into overly conceptual waters, where form starts to depend
on its cultural context, but I think a solid analysis o f this area is still possible.
Diagrammatic morphisms appear to be art; that is to say, they are pictorial, and made of
shapes and lines. They do not appear to be symbols, something that would fit, in a less
alarm-raising way, into the paradigm o f math-as-art. Instead, they appear to be math-inart - some shapes that are ultimately generated by math. O f course, one might argue that
the way they appear, especially to a layman, is secondary to their intrinsic nature. One
suspects that something so formal, in mathematics, must “have something to it” - that it
could be a manifestation o f “math-in-art.” In fact, this is not the case, and diagrammatic
morphisms are best described as symbols or signifiers. If one were to derive “math-inart” from them, that art might look something like a deformed rubber sheet (a familiar
metaphor to scholars of topology who endeavor to explain their field to lay audiences).
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But in fact these diagrammatic morphisms are something more akin to algebra - a way of
representing a logical intemality that eventually manifests or generates, at least in theory,
something overtly visual. This is to say diagrammatic morphisms are not the “end
product.” They are not “math-in-art,” but are a rather interesting example o f “math-asart,” because they look like they might be “math-in-art.”
I say these waters might be overly conceptual because if a given piece o f math has
visual properties, we need to ask whether or not it could then be called visual ethnomath.
Indeed, morphisms are a border case, because of the potential for a superficial, lay
interpretation o f them as some kind o f art that has been generated by math. Furthermore,
this “lay superficiality” is precisely what I am concerned with, culturally, artistically, and
from a research standpoint.
The most obvious examples of “math-in-art” all come from geometry; the
challenge comes in finding an example that does not infer that the visuality of math is
necessarily tied to its geometric offspring. Consider category theory, that very abstract
branch of modem math where objects are posited, and structures are built from their
relationships, without necessarily elaborating on the properties o f those objects, per se.37
What is “generated” from category theory? Most obviously, morphisms (and not
necessarily diagrammatic morphisms, which help bridge the gap between topology and
category theory38).
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Figure 1.

As seen above, morphisms (basically, a mapping between two mathematical
structures39) look geometric. And since they are associated with math, the general
assumption could be that their pictures must have been generated by math, as a right
triangle is generated by the Pythagorean Theorem. And, in a sense, they have been
generated by mathematics - they are the structure resulting from pre-existing
relationships and objects. A morphism amounts to b derived from a, which is perhaps the
only important thing we need to remember in terms o f morphisms being an example of
math-in-art (as well as, clearly, math-as-art). Perhaps we can illustrate the relationship of
math-as-art and math-in-art by imagining a Venn diagram: all math-in-art is math-as-art,
but math-as-art is not necessarily math-in-art. Regardless o f this, and regardless of those
aforementioned fuzzy gray areas, the distinction remains: math can generate form, and
math can be form. As stated previously, I am concerned with the latter.
Formal beauty, ethnomathematical beauty, and mathematical beauty appear to
have some sort o f relationship. When definitions of mathematical beauty are given, often
nothing related to visuality is expressed, but in order to communicate the notion of beauty
there might be a diagram or picture in which a sort of elegance, symmetry, or order is
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visually present 40 41 42. It is as if these definitions are expected to be insufficient, and it is
therefore felt that they need to be supplemented with something more conventionally
associated with “beauty.” This is understandable, considering that the word beauty has
historically been associated with visuality, or more specifically, with the phenomenal.
Mathematicians and adherents o f math may be semantically altering, or even
misusing, the term “beauty” when they talk o f “mathematical beauty.” With qualities like
succinctness, surprisingness, elegance, insightfulness, originality, and the ability o f a
proof to be easily-generalized being said to indicate beauty43, it becomes arguable that
any field in which there is some task to be accomplished, could refer to “x beauty” in
terms o f a method if that method tended to accomplish that given task, where “x” is an
adjective that describes the field of endeavor. For example, perhaps “medical beauty”
could refer to stitching up a cut optimally, such that it heals well, and perhaps “clerical
beauty” could refer to alphabetizing forms quickly and expediently. Using the term
“beauty” to refer to what is essentially mathematical competence seems to elevate the
discipline, socially and politically, establishing the phenomenon responsible for much of
the leftover visual culture of mathematics, once the mathematical “guts” are cleaned
away.
Euler’s Identity is probably the most frequently-given example o f mathematical
beauty44, and is familiar to some laypeople (such as myself - 1 heard about it in a firstterm calculus class in 1999):

ep' + 1 = 0
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In Euler’s Identity, we have the five most important numbers in mathematics,
along with the three most important operations: e, i, pi, 1, and 0, as well as
exponentiation, multiplication, and addition. This is a relevant example for an art-related
discussion because, visually, it is not particularly interesting (or beautiful); the “beauty”
inherent in this simple equation comes from its logical content, so there is no confusing
mathematical beauty and formal beauty here. In this way, the mathematical beauty at
hand is o f a pure sort, uncontaminated by visuality or perhaps even by ethnomathematical
considerations. Rather, this simple equation just is, as it is. Usually, examples of
mathematical beauty seem to somehow “cheat” and give snippets of visuality to help the
beauty along, but in this case the “beauty” is entirely logical. And by “beauty,” in this
case, something like great power expressed in simplicity is being advanced through the
use o f the word. The beautiful thing here amounts to a question: how, and why, in our
universe, do the five most important numbers in mathematics fit together and relate to
one another as simply as they possibly could?
While studying math years ago, I began to take interest in this category of
philosophical discourse, which is clearly related to the operation of mathematics,
although also clearly not essential to it.
To say that I have some experience with math is also to say that I have some
experience with the look of math. My experiences were similar to those o f many others: I
was required to take math classes in primary and secondary school, mostly disliked them,
and did a mediocre job at them. In 1997,1 experienced a traumatic brain injury that
changed that. After being hit by a car and then convalescing for several months in and out
o f the hospital, math was still not easy for me, but it had become fascinating, meaningful,
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and exciting. For many years I re-told a mythology to explain my newfound love of math:
the “shear-injury”45 had damaged my right temporal lobe, and with my poetic powers of
apprehension compromised I46 turned more to my left-brain to make sense o f reality. This
more logical approach meshed well with the intricacies o f introductory college
mathematics I encountered in a required class I took in the late 1990’s, and my success
there inspired me to pursue additional study. In spite o f the appealing romance of this
story, my success in math could have mostly been the result o f having a good pre
calculus teacher, or o f being mature enough at that point to make a serious go of school or x, or y, or z. But the mythology o f my left-brain kicking in to help out my damaged
right-brain became important to me as I re-told it again and again, even as brain science
research stated that the division o f cognitive labor might not be so clear-cut.47

I should add here that I thought at that time that the joy I experienced in doing
math had some kind o f spiritual significance. And while perhaps the fact that it fe lt
significant made it significant, I am now more inclined to think, perhaps cynically, that
\
my experience was not much different from the satisfaction one gets when solving a
crossword puzzle. Here was something that worked out: a right answer, some bit of
beautiful and “intricate simplicity,” in the face o f a largely uncontrollable and confusing
reality o f existence. The pleasure o f “getting it right” had little to do with my teacher’s
assurance that I was doing the right thing, but what mattered was the fact that I could
match solutions with what was perhaps a universal template; there is a right answer to
math problems, which constitutes a satisfaction and fulfillment that a student of the
humanities might never experience. This could have accounted for the feeling of
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Pythagorean mysticism I was experiencing; I was in my early 20’s then, and I think at a
good place, emotionally and mentally, for learning and doing math.
I remember one day in pre-calculus class particularly well: something about
trigonometry was being explained, and tears came to my eyes because I “got it” so
thoroughly; this symbolic and logical system made so much sense, and it all seemed
“perfect.” Especially in light o f that experience, I can now see why Pythagoras equated
the sense of perfection sometimes associated with math with the tautological perfection
o f God48. But was this a Jamesian mystical experience49? Certainly it was an individual
experience, one centered on the phenomenological apprehension of a perceived nature of
reality. Perhaps all math - the doing o f all math - is inherently (at least potentially) a
mystical experience, because it can have a sense o f “revelation” attached. And perhaps
the sense o f revelation - getting a “right answer,” not according to a teacher’s edition
textbook, but to a universal template o f how the universe works - indicated that I was
having one o f only a few spiritual or mystical experiences in my life.50
As I advanced to calculus, the concept of limits again harkened to something
universal and meaningful, just as trigonometry had a few months earlier (notably, the
function o f both limits and trigonometry are both commonly illustrated graphically). A
limit involves the concept o f a thing approaching another thing, and continuing to
approach it forever, without necessarily ever reaching it. This concept is well-illustrated
by a parable called “Xeno’s Paradox.” Imagine that an archer shoots an arrow at a target
10 meters away; in order to travel to the target, the arrow must first travel half the
distance (5 meters). Then, in order to travel the remaining 5 meters, the arrow must travel
half o f that distance (2.5 meters). And again, and again, the arrow must travel smaller and
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smaller distances to traverse the now seemingly infinite expanse of 10 meters. It seems, if
approached this way, that Xeno has demonstrated that movement is impossible. Of
course, it is not, and arrows reach their targets when they are shot at them. But Xeno’s
paradox works to visually demonstrate the nature of the limit, which operates similarly to
Xeno’s arrow. A good way to illustrate a limit is with a coordinate plane:

y
Figure 2.

As you can see, as the curve continues to the right, it never reaches the X-axis, but
only becomes closer and closer to it as it approaches a distance infinitely far from the Yaxis. Incidentally, the limit o f this function (represented by the curved line) would be said
to be 0, because that is the number, as it is represented graphically by the x axis, to which
the function draws infinitely close but never reaches. This rigorous dealing with infinity
also contributes to what might be construed as the overall spiritual or mystical feeling of
calculus.

Is math, or can math, be more than the marks on paper that we write down and
see? Is it really possible to separate out the working guts of math - the logical
intemalities, as 1 put it earlier, from the pure visual representation of math? If the math
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we see on the paper is the signifier, then what is the referent? These questions point to an
over-arching issue: that of “deep” vs. “shallow” understanding o f mathematics.
The “shallow” approach is the easier to explain, especially with the help of
examples, the first o f which I will take from pre-calculus algebra. When dealing with
negative exponents, one has another notation option: to convert them to reciprocal
fractions with positive exponents, which are sometimes easier to deal with. In this way,
x“4 becomes 1/x4. Without understanding why this “trick” works, it is very easy - trivial,
one could say51 - to memorize that whenever you see something o f the form x'n, you can
convert it to l/xn, and thereby get the right answer. This is an example of the “if you see
this, do that” mentality, and it is prevalent in students’ approaches, probably on up to
analysis . At its essence, it is an approach based on memorizing tricks and patterns
without really understanding the inner mechanics of how a given theorem or formula of
mathematics works.
And this approach - this “stupid human trick” method o f doing math - becomes
more and more ingrained, and in fact becomes more and more necessary, as a student
advances to calculus and beyond, where a myriad o f tricks and shortcuts have been
developed for differentiating (also known as “taking the derivative o f ’) functions of
various types. In every math text I have seen, the reason a given trick works is
demonstrated using the algebraic definition o f the derivative, as it was developed by
Newton and Leibniz, as a sort o f “p ro o f’ (although not in the strict mathematical sense),
and then the simple mechanical gesture o f manipulating the math symbols in the correct
way to get the right answer is demonstrated.

A good example o f this comes from differentiating a function o f the type f(x) = xc
(such as f(x) = x3). The example function’s derivative, or f^x), is 2x2. All I had to do in
this case was take that “3,” put it in front, then subtract 1 from the exponent, so as to turn
3 into 2. This is mindlessly easy - far easier than doing the multiplication and long
division one learns in elementary school - and the process (using “the power rule”) works
to take the derivative o f a function of type xc every time (where x is the algebraic variable
and where c is some constant).
The reason the power rule works has to do with the algebraic definition o f the
derivative (itself often considered to be a thing o f mathematical beauty), and measuring
variable change. This can be illustrated algebraically, and a simple function like f(x) = x3
can be differentiated algebraically by plugging it into the definition of the derivative. But
this is, relatively speaking, a time-consuming and tedious process, and there is simply no
need to do it other than for explanatory purposes - to try and impart a “deeper
understanding” of math. For people like engineers and physicists, who need to take
\

derivatives in order to solve problems in their fields, there is no need to leam about the
algebraic definition o f the derivative and how to differentiate functions “the long way;”
all they need to leam is the aforementioned trick, and a whole battery of tricks like them:
“The Product Rule.” “The Reciprocal Rule.” “The Quotient Rule.” “The Chain Rule.”
Etc.53

Math is thereby reduced to something like a Sudoku puzzle or Rubik’s Cube;
certain configurations of symbols that appear on a paper are manipulated in certain
memorized ways, which then yield the right answer. For people who use math in some
professional capacity (such as engineers and experimental physicists), this is all they ever
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need to know. They do not even really have to learn about the definition of the derivative
that one first time, when they might be forced to plug a function into it to differentiate
“the long way” for the purpose of understanding how the nuts and bolts of math work,
before they quickly fall back on a series of memorized symbolic manipulations.
If these symbols are being manipulated and manipulated correctly, and it can be
determined that some deeper understanding is thereby being ignored, then what is this
“ignored thing,” and what are its parameters? What constitutes a “deep understanding” of
math? It is difficult to quantify, most obviously because it is subjective - if someone were
to assert that he or she had a “deep understanding” of math, then could this self-report be
successfully debated with the response “No, you don’t”? In spite of this difficulty, I see
three ways to investigate a definition o f “deep understanding.”
Firstly, the method for achieving mathematical depth might be as I infer above: by
understanding and working with the proof and derivations o f every formula one uses to
solve problems. The pitfall here is that in working with these proofs and derivations it is
necessary to perform the same sorts o f symbolic manipulations one started off doing
when solving the original problem, and so in a sense one is no further along in achieving
depth o f mastery. In other words, one can never escape “doing math” - it will always
consist o f symbolic manipulation, regardless of the fact that a particular sequence of
manipulations might represent a meaningful derivation of some used formula.
A second possible definition could employ similar terminology to that used in
defining or expounding upon mathematical beauty - especially in the generalizability of
some particular bit o f math: if enough rote calculations or symbolic manipulations are
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performed, then a larger picture might start to become evident from the continuity of
mathematical truth that reveals itself. For example, if a student were to take courses in
single and multi-variable calculus, linear algebra, differential equations, and finally real
and complex analysis, then maybe after the solution of every problem in every associated
textbook some deep understanding o f math might seep in, in the midst of a cognitive state
similar to the later stages o f language acquisition.

Finally, can a deep understanding simply be defined in the negative, as anything a
shallow understanding is not? It is straightforward to define a shallow understanding of
math as symbolic manipulation, performed as though the mathematician were nothing
more than a computer. With this in mind, perhaps we can surmise that emotional creative
content - that which our hypothetical, robotic, shallow mathematician does not possess amounts to that “deeper understanding” of math. This creative input and approach
amounts to math-as-art, or more precisely, math as an art.
The difficulty we encounter when trying to establish some parameters for the
mathematical referent - that part of the two-part math structure that is not merely the
symbols and their visuality - again speaks to an inherent ineffability and mysticism
within the discipline o f math, similar in that sense to Platonic ideals o f math “existing”
somehow beyond human exercise, and also similar in that sense to the notion of
mathematical beauty. But most importantly, in terms o f my discussion, it is these symbols
and their manipulation, apart from any sort of mathematical depth, whose visual culture
is to be exploited. So, when the content is lifted out leaving the superficiality with which
I am concerned, it is analogous to the superficial symbolic manipulation o f “human-trick
math,” which works, but ignores the depth required to explore mathematical beauty.

28

Examples of Ethnomathematical Visuality
In this chapter I will present three brief examples in math that illustrate a
relationship between visual culture and mathematics, the first focusing on the
development and history o f mathematical notation, and the second and third both dealing
with contemporary mathematics as it relates to my own artwork.
Robert Recorde (1 5 1 0 - 1558) developed what we know as the modem “equals
sign” based on his graphical interpretation of his own phrase: “no two things can be more
equal.” It was featured in his 1557 textbook The Whetstone o f Witte:
Uotobett,foj cafic altcratio of tq u s tm s .y UriU pjto*
pounDe a fetue eraples,btcaufe the ertraaton of time
rootcs,maic the tnojc aptlp bee luioughte. anb to a*
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Figure 3.

“And to auoide the tedioufe repetition o f thefe woordes : is equalle to : I will fette as I doe
often in woorke vfe, a paire o f paralleles, or Gemowe lines of one lengthe, thus: =,
bicaufe noe 2 thynges, can be moare equalle.”
“A nd to avoid the tedious repetition o f these words: "is equal to", I will set (as 1 do often
in work use) a pair ofparallels (or Gemowe lines) o f one length (thus =), because no two
things can be more equal. ”
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Recorde’s development o f the equals sign, now a ubiquitous part o f visual culture,
both in mathematics and in a wider semiotic context, was a design decision - a
hieroglyphic that Recorde thought captured the notion o f quantitative equality. In this
way, Recorde’s usage demonstrates a sort o f anti-Saussureanism, to perhaps make an
extremely simple point sound complicated. Saussure’s idea about signifier and referent
was that there is no intrinsic relationship between the sign “cat” - the text on paper or
spoken out loud - and the referent cat, the thing that walks around and meows; the
relationship is arbitrary and constructed. But, in the case of Recorde’s equals sign, we see
that it may be said to inherently resemble equality. In fact, this is why he chose it,
although it is not difficult to see that it is not exclusively true that “noe 2 thynges, can be
moare equalle” - his equal sign might have been two dots, or two squares.

As an artist and researcher, my focus is “math-as-art,” which implies the usage of
the look o f math without math’s functionality. This leads directly into questions
surrounding mathematical notation, and its development; “the look of math” ultimately
amounts to “the way math is written,” and the way these cultural categories that are so
familiar to us (such as the equals sign, addition symbol, subtraction symbol, etc) carved
out their place within a larger visual culture.
Consider a set o f mathematical objects called “diagrammatic morphisms,” which
feature prominently in my artwork. They are mathematically significant in that they
represent a kind o f intersection between topology and category theory, and artistically
significant because they are complex line diagrams that are intended as symbols for
topological structures - in other words, they are representative math, as opposed to math
generated structures. This might make them “math-as-art,” and not “math-in-art,” except
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that a dichotomy o f the generator and the generated is a causality structure that is easily
broken (especially as mathematics become more advanced), and in fact analysis of
mathematical forms as either being the result of some kind o f calculation or being the
calculation themselves is something that is often and largely beyond my ability.
A morphism, as the term is used in mathematics, is a structure o f relationships, a
precise way of defining how elements in one set map to elements in another set. The
complexity o f morphisms can become such that representing them diagrammatically, as
opposed to algebraically, is the only viable method. In fact, in terms of pure visuality,
diagrammatic notation is not limited to morphisms, and a more general term for the sorts
o f things that look like the sorts o f things I like to draw might be “string diagrams.”
“Morphism” comes out of category theory (and is in fact at the theoretical center o f
category theory), and I use the term mostly because the string diagrams I copied
happened to be diagrammatic morphisms. However, I think it is important to note that for
the purposes o f my explorations of the visuality o f math, either string diagrams or
diagrammatic morphisms would suffice - certainly I would not have been able to tell the
difference.
My mathematical abilities are limited; I took one year of calculus, and most o f my
understanding o f it has faded from my memory. And as far as my (art) audience is
concerned, it has been my experience that a discourse o f calculus, or perhaps any sort of
“guts” o f math, makes people’s eyes glaze over as they wonder if they are really reading
a text rooted in the visual arts. Furthermore, the nature of mathematics is such that one
topic leads into the next, without a clear delineation between them (perhaps ironically
contrasting with the nature o f most mathematical objects themselves54). So, when I find

in my research into this rather alien world that the phrase “Diagrammatic Morphism”
might not be precisely correct, and that in fact “Penrose Graphical Notation”55 might be a
better way to say it, but then I find that the pictures associated with Penrose graphical
notation do not look like the drawings I have done, and that I also need to wrestle with
the geometric term “tensor,” I am reminded that I am an artist, and not a mathematician.
The best way for a me, a non-mathematician, to go about rigorous scholarship and
research into mathematics is to give the titles o f some books that I am looking at or have
looked at, and perhaps with some help arrive at a generalized understanding of a given
field, which leads me into my final “case study” in math: the prose used in advanced
mathematical papers.
As a study o f math moves to higher scholarly levels, much of the associated text
reads like prose. Some o f it is highly incomprehensible to a layman, and becomes so
specialized and laden with terminology that it can take on a surreal or absurd quality (“A
somewhat more promising alternative is to sum over all the diffeomorphism equivalence
classes o f embedded spin foams. This idea is rather natural [.. .]”56). However, some of
the prose is often quite non-technical, and paints things in very broad strokes, using a
language couched in metaphors that sound almost literary:
What is truly remarkable about this theorem is that, on the one hand,
framed tangles are (relative versions of) central objects in 3- and 4manifold topology, and on the other, the axioms for a ribbon category flow
inexorably from the internal structure of category theory once it is realized
that braided mononoidal cateogries are, in some sense, more reasonable
objects than symmetrical mononoidal categories.57

Regarding the above, my attention is particularly drawn to “the axioms for a
ribbon category flow inexorably from the internal structure of category theory,” and the
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notion o f braided mononoidal categories being (in some sense) more “reasonable” objects
than symmetrical mononoidal categories. Certainly something “flowing from the internal
structure” o f a field of math is not a technical description of object behavior - how fast
does it flow? How far? And what does it really mean to “flow,” if we presume (hopefully
intelligently) that this is a metaphor? And then, we have “reasonable,” even with the
added caveat-like phrase o f “in some sense.” This example sentence seems, even to a
layman like me, a far cry from the precision and discreetness regularly associated with
CO

mathematics. It is prose; hand-wavy

prose employing imprecise, literary terminology. It

surprised me when I first noticed the existence of such language in advanced
mathematics papers, and I find its existence relevant to my own research interests,
broadly termed as the culture o f mathematics, or “ethnomath.”
The sort o f “dumbing-down” o f concepts, or blunting them into literary forms that
we see in these advanced papers on mathematics is a similar process that I am going
through when I take algebra, diagrams, or geometry and “dumb them down” into artwork.
It is my own impulse to use such pejorative language, and I do so in a similar though
harsher way than with my use of the term “superficiality” early on in this paper. So, math
is smart and art is dumb? Maybe, depending on the definition o f “intelligence.”59 The fact
that the transformation o f math into literature or the transformation o f math into art lends
itself (perhaps only in my writing, but I doubt it) to terms like “dumbing down” or
“superficial,” that are in turn sometimes perceived as being indicative o f a “lowered
state,” might tell us something about that primitive, politically-charged, Derridean binary
o f right-brained vs. left brained, and arts-humanities vs. STEM (Science Technology
Engineering Math). Specifically, it confirms what Derrida tells us: that one o f the states

o f the binary is going to be politically elevated over the other. And, true to form, and as I
mentioned earlier, STEM is “higher” (at least in contemporary culture) than the art and
humanities. My artwork is in part “about” this phenomenon: that the social location of
mathematics is an elevated one for most people, and that transplanting this location into
math-as-art does something, I suppose tautologically, to its social location.
The existence o f prose like this in math papers as well as the positive reaction I
get from people who deal professionally and classically with advanced math when they
see my drawings makes me think that this Derridean binary is illegitimate60, and that the
yearning we see in arts-humanities to co-opt some o f the technical rigor, clarity of
definition, and non-fuzziness o f sci-tech has a converse counterpart: that science needs
art, and wants art. The impulse to shy away from algebra and move towards mathematical
diagrams that is sometimes necessary in higher mathematics for expediency's sake leads
me towards this sort o f thinking as well; the adage “a picture is worth a thousand words”
seems to apply here, and to the many pages o f algebraic topology (or topological algebra)
that would be necessary to represent a single, elegant string diagram. This is the visuality
o f math.
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Cases of Math-as-Art
The questions I pose around math-as-art vs. math-in-art, and regarding the
possibility o f “lifting out” the logical intemalities of math to leave behind a relic of visual
culture which is then granted new meaning, and concerning the possibility of a
relationship between formal and mathematical beauty, are not completely new. Three
case studies in the tradition of visual and conceptual art follow, which elaborate on the
relationship I am attempting to build between math, culture, and visuality.
As I mentioned in the first paragraph o f this paper, Duchamp was probably the
only historically important artist to engage with mathematics directly, such that the nature
o f math was conceptually integrated with the work itself. In his writings, as an example
o f his “non-retinal art”61 which sometimes took the form of puzzles or brain-teasers, we
find the following:62
Calcul par l'absurde mathématique algébrique Si A=intention 10.
B=Crainte 5
C=Desiron a une première équation
C=a-b
et une 2 équation
C=A x B
Math ces 2 éq. sont absurdes
C=50 / C = 5 / 2C = 55 / 2=27.5
S iA = 1 0 / B = 5 / c = 27.5
Si A = a = 9 / B=a/ 3 =3/ C +33/ 2=16.5

Variables are assigned to “intent” (intention), “dread” (crainte) and “desire”
(<desir), and the interrelationships o f these emotional states hinted at with mathematical
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properties: desire is given to be intention with dread taken away, and in a second analysis
desire is intention “multiplied by” dread (the first equation, I think, seems more
intuitively correct). Following that is mostly nonsensical algebra. Calcul par l'absurde
mathématique algébrique (“Calculation by absurd mathematical algebra”) amounts to a
critique o f math and logic - obviously math is incapable o f elaborating on human
emotion, and this shortcoming is illustrated with absurdity. The piece is certainly an
example o f “math-as-art,” although it is conceptual and not at all concerned with
visuality.
Duchamp's conceptualism constituted an originary moment in the history of
conceptualism, and as an artist he took such an approach as far as it could be taken; one
wonders if his frustration ensuing from this dead-end was what drove him from the art
world. But regardless, in order to explore math for math's sake - to explore math-as-art he delved into the conceptual, and moved away from visuality as a significant aspect of
his work. In my explorations, visuality is vitally important - in fact, it is literally all I
have once I take away the concept, or logical content, or utility, or machinations of
mathematics. I am left with a husk, a shell, which then has the potential to be filled with
new meaning.
My second case study has to do with form rather than content. Dieter Roth’s
Schriftbild does with text what it is my goal to do with math: it lifts out the internal
structure o f the referent and ascribes to it a new visuality and cultural meaning. In fact,
this specific piece by Roth, translated into English as something like “Writing-Drawing,”
was the one of the earliest, if not the earliest, inspirations for the “math-drawings” that I
have mention repeatedly in this essay. Roth’s process appears to have been to scribble
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down love letter after love letter, one on top of another, until the meaning of the text was
made all but illegible and had instead formed an image - it had re-contextualized itself
from a reliance on codified semiotic meaning and towards a broader visual, formal,
adherence to pictorial meaning.

Figure 4.

My math drawings look almost nothing like Schriftbild (above) - every line of
math in my drawings is legible, and although they are often crowded image-fields, they
tend not to be so chaotic. Rather, the point of similarity between Roth’s work and my
own work is between Schriftbild and my textual scholarship: regarding math-as-art, and
removing logical meaning and transforming visual artifacts of symbols into images. Roth
does this by obscuring the text with more and more layers until everything has become

illegible, and I do it on the understanding that the vast majority o f my audience will be
unable to de-code the mathematical forms I use, thereby allowing for their assignment of
a new meaning through a new approach to visual culture: an approach generated by a
given observer's personal, emotional relationship with these mathematical symbols.
Sometimes, the proverbial 1% o f the viewers has the required background in, say,
algebraic topology to make some mathematical sense out o f my displayed math. This has
happened three times at the time of this writing, and in each case the schooled observer
responded favorably. The pitfall I would have anticipated when dealing with a “literate”
observer might have raised questions surrounding mastery and competency.631 might
have expected the accusation, “You don’t have the right to be using this math, because
you don’t understand it.” In fact that question has been posed, but never by the
professionally math-literate; on the contrary, the math-literate seem thrilled that their
discipline's inherently visual nature is being treated as something worthy of focus by
someone working in the fine arts.
The important parallel between Roth's Schriftbild and my work is the separation
o f form from utility; as meaning is taken away from symbols, they are then infused with
new meaning. It is impossible for a symbol to exist and to be devoid of meaning. For
example, in my artwork, if mathematical logic is taken away from “2x + 4 = 8,” then we
are left with Arabic and Greco-Roman symbols - the mathematical notation of algebra.
This is a more shared meaning than the codified mathematical meaning, simply because it
has a historical and cultural context that is built into it, rather than having a set of
assigned logical properties that are fairly arbitrarily assigned. There is a reason the “2”
looks like a 2, and the “x” looks like an x: the development of each o f these symbols has
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a history. However, the logical operation o f these symbols is not based on that specific
history or culture, and can be lifted out from, or de-mapped from, the symbology. For
instance, / \ j Ccrv> r might be a mathematical statement that operates the same way as
2x + 4 = 8, despite the fact that it does not have collective cultural significance. So, to
sum up, when in math or language, symbols are used and meaning is taken away from
them, other layers o f meaning float up to the surface, or are imported from elsewhere, to
take new precedence.
This is the case with Roth's Schriftbild: because the legibility o f the love letters
has been taken away, we are left with the possibility of some other form of meaning
holding sway, one that is not necessarily obvious. Meaning could reside in the
subconscious mind64, or in the observer's own feelings about art. The difference comes
from the fact that in Roth's images, the symbols themselves have been combined and laid
one atop the other such that they are actually no longer readable, whereas in my images,
the obfuscation o f meaning is contextual rather than formalistic. But the central idea of
separating inner and outer structure is what makes Schriftbild an important inspiration for
my studio work.
Earlier on I gave the work o f M.C. Escher and the work of some contemporary
computer artists as counter-examples o f “math-in-art.” However, there is a fine line here:
sometimes when something is “math-in-art” - when a given work has its form generated
in part by math - it also ends up being at least in part about math. This leads me to my
third and final case study in art.
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The contemporary work of Bill Ralph amounts to computer generated images, but
inside his concept is also some interest in math for its own sake. The artist says, “What
drives [my] process is the extraordinary and often chaotic mathematical behavior of
systems built on the iterated function sequence x(n+l)=f(x(n)) where f is a function
carefully constructed for its mathematical and artistic interest.65” Bill Ralph’s area of
math is algebraic topology, which is perhaps not coincidentally what I find to be the most
fruitful area of math from the standpoint of visual culture, and it is this area on which
several of my own “math drawings” are based.

Figure 5.

I offer Bill Ralph’s work not as a formal example (the look of his artwork is that
o f contemporary computer-generated images, and is not of particular interest to my
research) but because it involves the grey area to which I have referred. In fact, perhaps
artists who rely so exclusively on mathematics (or computer programs) in creating their
work cannot help but make their work at least partially about these things. Self-reflexivity
is a well-traveled conceptual avenue in contemporary art, one that fits in well with the
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Postmodernist orientation that generates this text, as well as in mathematical constructs
like Bill Ralph’s “x(n+l)=f(x(n)).”
Although Bill Ralph is a professional artist whose curriculum vitae documents
exhibition, the primary focus of his career is as part of the faculty in the department of
mathematics at Brock University in St. Catherine, Ontario, Canada. From this social
location we can reliably determine the importance of mathematics in his work - not just
as the “engine” behind its formal content, but as a thing for Bill Ralph to focus on in and
o f itself. Although he does not make any pictures of math in the same way that I do, the
implicit math in his images takes on more importance than merely as a tool o f production,
even if we can only determine this by reading his website, noting his profession, and
reading the way he conceptually frames his artwork. In other words, if I were not given
some conceptual and textual background for his work, I would assume it to be purely an
example o f math-in-art. However, since B. Ralph in effect says “I am a math professor, I
am interested in math, here is how I derive my images, and here is an example of some of
the math I use to derive them,” this proverbial wall-text is now next to all o f his creations,
and nudges them over toward “math-as-art” and into the paradigm of ethnomathematical
visuality.
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Making Art
In my studio research, I am exploring the visuality of math using familiar
materials: white 20" by 30" Stonehenge rag paper with its iconic rough edges that, at least
to me, indicate a sort o f archetype o f “art supplies.” Process-wise, this project enjoys
something o f a complex history. The original inspiration came from Dieter Roth’s
Schriftbild, which are a series of love letters layered over top o f one another, so that they
look like a jumbled pile o f colorful scribbles. As it happens, my old day planners, which I
have saved since around the time I started my flirtation with academic mathematics,
contained some forms that were almost identical to Schriftbild. My thought when I
recognized this was, “Why not do something similar to Schriftbild, or similar to my day
planners, but using math instead o f love letters?”
Conceptually, my explorations center on the visuality o f mathematics, as it is
either organically generated through doing math, or copied from math other people have
done. Making this distinction is important, in that the question as to whether a drawing
constitutes “real” or “virtual” mathematics (constitutes working math or visual artifacts
o f math) has implications for not only the art-making process but the result and
observation. The first type o f drawing involves harvesting a source like a graduate thesis
in mathematics for its visual content. The result o f this is a sort of sterility and
mausoleum sensitivity about the mathematics, which is not necessarily undesirable;
having a wax museum o f mathematical artifacts is an interesting prospect for me, one that
speaks to the history o f mathematics and all o f its “yellowed textbook” cultural
associations with library intellectualism.
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Over the course of my drawing project, I have classified three types o f formal
elements in mathematics. In the few pages that follow, I will provide images of these
isolated formal elements in math, immediately followed by a particular drawing of mine
that makes nearly exclusive use of that element. The first set comprises the symbolic,
which includes arithmetic and algebra, and probably looks like what most people think of
when they imagine “math.” This example is also notable in that it comes from a
conference published in 1981, before the advent of LaTeX66, a markup language used to
produce mathematical documents. So, this particular mathematical phrase on the
following page enjoys a historical quality, lent by its being typewritten.

\
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Figure 6.

Figure 7.
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The second type of formal element in math, seen below, is the geometric.

Figure 8.

Figure 9.
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The third type is the diagrammatic. At first glance, or even after a long
inspection, a diagrammatic element might appear quite similar to a geometric element.
The difference comes from its place within mathematical logic: a diagrammatic element
functions representationally, and is more like a symbol, whereas a geometric element
functions more as a thing-unto-itself - something that is in itself an end-product, and can
be represented with symbols. The example of diagrammatic notation on the next page
comes from a book on diagrammatic morphisms, and was described to me by Dr. Dan
Christensen o f the University of Western Ontario Department of Mathematics as “a tube
wrapped around a knot.”
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Figure 10.

Figure 11.
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These three elements - the symbolic, the geometric, and the diagrammatic constitute one strategy within my drawing practice: copying math, and arranging formal
elements; essentially, I am painting, drawing, or sculpting with math. The other approach
is to do math - in my case, I am restricted to arithmetic, simple algebra, and first-year
calculus - and then present this as art-object. I term this approach the organic, which is
exemplified on the following page.
It can be noted that this last type - the organic - has the potential to be a wider
category, and in fact one that might itself contain geometric, algebraic, and diagrammatic
elements. In that sense “the organic” is not so much a formal categorization as it is an
analysis o f process. But with that in mind, “organically” producing math, or in this case a
math-drawing, yields a particular formalism that might be impossible to produce when
copying math out o f books. The most important of my drawings that follows an organic
process o f creation that yields organic formal elements has been titled “the power rule.”
For the creation o f “the power rule,” I re-learned some of the calculus that had
almost totally escaped my memory and took derivatives on drawing paper (using the
power rule o f differentiation). The concept and process surrounding "the power rule" are
so vital, from my perspective, that it becomes difficult for me to analyze the drawing
objectively and formally, and ascertain whether or not it is working as a visual object.
Even if it were not working, this drawing is immensely important to me and to my project
o f “the look of math.”
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Figure 12.

Figure 13.
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Perhaps, in the case o f these “organic” math drawings, the awareness that the
results are destined to be “art objects” colors the process o f doing math, such that the
math done in these drawings has a different look than math done on a homework
assignment or test. The visual structure o f my notes and tests in math class became
important to me, even so many years ago, before the idea for “math as art” specifically
and overtly occurred to me courtesy o f Dieter Roth, my day planners, and my own hint of
an academic background in math.
The division of aesthetic formalism to be found in mathematics67 into the
symbolic, the geometric, the diagrammatic, and the organic is, like any system of
categorization o f pre-existing objects, imperfect. This was demonstrated to me as I tried
out collage in my math drawings, and was arranging cut-out bits o f photocopied math
into piles according to these categories. Most of the cut-outs obviously fit into one or
another formal category, but occasionally I encountered some ambiguity, as in the case of
certain paper cut-outs that were diagrammatic but looked geometric. I knew they were
diagrammatic because I had read about them, and knew their source. Perhaps if I had not,
I would not have thought twice about putting these bits into the “geometric” pile. My
project is about “the visuality o f math” - the way the written markings of math look,
apart from their function as a logical system. Translating this into a kind o f ethic, does
this not mean that I should make a decision based purely on how the shape in front o f me
looks? In a sense this scenario feels like a test case to gauge whether or not I am in good
faith regarding my hypothesis, which presumes that some-thing’s inner and outer natures
are separable. When I take a diagrammatic object that looks geometric and put it in the
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geometric pile, I tend to feel uneasy, because in a mathematical way I think “No, this is
wrong,” while in an aesthetic or artistic way I am forced to concede “This is right.”
In addition to my math drawings, my practice also continues to involve materials
from the digital domain, in which I was trained as an undergraduate. Sound art is one
manifestation that may be conceptually digressive regarding this thesis because it appears
to be an example o f “math-in-art” as opposed to “math-as-art.” In other words, the sound
art that I do is inherently mathematical, and inherently physics-based; it involves the
creation o f specific pitches that are numerically related to one other, and using this set of
“new notes” - notes that do not exist in Western music - to create roughly three-minute
compositions o f similar form (pitches composed of pure sine waves intersect and create
intervals and even occasionally chords, while a guitar that has had its strings re-tuned to
match the sine waves is played along).
As an example o f my sound work, one composition is based on a series of known
and often-used mathematical constants, such as pi (roughly 3.142)68 and e (roughly
2.718). In order to generate an interval, or a pairing o f notes, based on this constant, one
assigns one note the value o f “ 1” and then the other note the value o f the constant (say,
3.142). Then, say the first note is pitched at 100 Hz; using a simple proportion equation,
one then figures the second note to be 314.2 Hz in order to match that “ 1 to pi” ratio
(actually, as you can see in the chart on the next page, my base was 82.407 Hz, so-chosen
because it is the frequency of the low “E” string used in standard guitar tuning). This
process is repeated for all six notes, using one note as a “base,” and choosing such
mathematical constants as to make re-tuning the guitar strings to match them involve as
little deviation from a given string’s intended tension as possible.
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Guitar string

Constant name

Constant value

Multiplied by

Frequency in Hz

E

base

1

82.407

82.407

A

Plastic Constant

1.325

82.407

109.189

D

Golden Ratio

1.618

82.407

133.334

G

e

2.718

82.407

223.982

B

Pi

3.142

82.407

258.923

e

Levy's Constant

3.276

82.407

269.965

Figure 14.

The chart above shows the 6 guitar strings (and 6 pitches used), as well as the
name of the mathematical constant with which a given string is associated, the value of
the “base” by which that constant must be multiplied in order to get a proper frequency
for the note, and then the frequency o f that note and/or string. This chart demonstrates
why this project is not just mathematical but ethnomathematical, and why it is not
concerned only with math-in-art but with math-as-art. Simply, it is because the intervals
are being chosen based on numbers that are often used in the discipline of math, like the
Golden Ratio, Levy’s Constant, and the Plastic Constant. In using these constants to
generate my pitches, 1 am looking directly at mathematics, and not just using it to
namelessly generate pitch; in this case, math is an actor in the foreground, and not just the
background.

Animation is an obvious synthesis of drawing and sound, and I have come to see
it as a culmination and resolution of my art practice, as it has developed in this Master of
Fine Arts program.
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My undergraduate studies were branded as having an “Imaging and Digital Arts”
focus, and all o f my work there was classified as “media art”: video or sound projects,
produced with some kind of digital device and then exhibited on some kind of digital
device. After continuing with this approach in graduate school for a brief period, I
discovered that I wanted some material experience - drawing, sculpture, print, etc;
something less constrained into a single subculture of contemporary fine art. Later, after
several months o f this experimentation, I returned to media art (specifically, to
soundtracked animation), but did so informed by a surrealistic Kandinsky-Twombly-Miro
aesthetic that was not so present in my undergraduate or pre-graduate school work, which
tended to look like a synthesis o f comic book illustration, graphic design, and Photoshop
collage. So, in a sense, the results o f my material experimentation served as “concept art”
for videos that were, after participation in the discourses within my graduate program,
more able to break out o f the cultural constraints o f traditional animated drawing
(specifically, strict character-based conflict/resolution narrative, which is a fairly narrow
way to work if used as an exclusive domain).
On the following page are two stills from a short, animated, soundtracked video
that uses some of the visual elements o f math I isolated in earlier work (diagrammatic,
algebraic, geometric, and organic), and which also uses sound to bring a vitality to the
mathematical visuality that was less immediate in the drawings. In a sense, my
animations are what my drawings want to be, and also what they cannot be.

Figure 15.

F igure 16.

54

Conclusions
I stress ethnomathematics over mathematics in order to emphasize that my focus
is on math as a cultural relic, like sets o f dinosaur bones that indicate some past life. Not
only is my artwork not concerned with mathematical content, as it might be used to build
a set o f interlocking shapes, but it is also important to remember that my artwork is not
“about math” in the sense that it demonstrates some quality o f mathematics itself, such as
using only a prime number of colors or even trying to formally interpret and express
some universal quality o f math. It is only “about math” in the sense that it showcases the
visual relic of math: the lines, marks and symbols that someone doing math puts down on
a paper, chalkboard, LaTeX editor, etc. It is the pure visuality o f these markings-on-paper
with which I am concerned, as well as the relationship they have with the artist, and later,
the observer. This relationship is built out o f things that exist in the observer’s mind-brain
that interact with mathematical symbols, and create new phenomenological objects.
Pure mathematics is like much contemporary “gallery art” in that both are
immediately impractical. Both can theoretically be monetized after some time and in
some way, but as they are bom, neither a proof in category theory nor a nailed-together
sculpture made of construction debris can work to achieve any other ends than existing,
or perhaps providing a site for discourse.

It might seem that I have written a lot about math, and not very much about art. In
fact, that is the nature o f the territory in which I am working. Art has become, since the
early 20th century and with its first seeds o f conceptualism, a category without apparent
boundaries. In one o f my studio critiques I mentioned that one o f the things I liked best
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about contemporary art as a discipline was this limitlessness: one could, I said, tack up
your completed tax forms to a gallery wall and be taken just as seriously as an oil painter
or ceramicist. “It’s been done,” someone responded, which got a laugh. The point is that I
do not need to talk about art, per se, because talking about art per se has become
somewhat redundant in view of our Postmodern de-categorization of styles, media,
concepts, and forms.
So, it seems that in post-Postmodemism69,1 no longer need to justify anything to
a committee and explain why it should bear the gilded moniker “art.” No one has, really,
since 1917 . So, math-as-art is not revolutionary. Nothing can be revolutionary in art
anymore, in fact, and the potential of art to be a research discipline cannot exist in some
sense. The word “revolutionary” itself inplies a historical and linear continuity, one that
has been halted. The Duchampian revolution in art was disruptive in a similar way that
Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem was disruptive in mathematics (and in the way transhistorical, trans-linear, trans-evolutionary Postmodernism has been to any intellectual
discipline): as the latter demonstrated the un-provability of the axioms within a given
logical system using only the tools o f that logical system, the former similarly posed an
axiomatic challenge to art by asking the question “What is it, really?”
I have heard it argued that if indeed the term “art” is so all encompassing, fuzzyedged, and broad, it in fact loses meaning. I do not disagree, and that is part of the reason
I find it mostly unnecessary to talk about “art,” or those creative endeavors that have been
termed “art”. This is not an essay in art history, exploring what might be worthy of the
label. In order for something to be art now, all that needs to happen is for people to pay
attention to that thing - it needs to somehow get pulled out of “the everyday71,” and be
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reflected upon with a particular awareness, perhaps a meditative one, such as we might
find in Zen, in prayer, and perhaps in doing math.

One could take any sort o f mental object - chemistry, ladybugs, roll-top desks,
racism, etc - and say “this object has never been specifically or importantly isolated as
art-per-se.” Duchamp’s Fountain was a statement o f the universality of this principle. In
a way, writing a thesis on some special case of “anything can be art” might seem
unnecessary. Maybe the title o f this essay could take the form of “The Look of X,” where
X is something, some mental object, some noun, preferably an intellectual discipline or
activity like math: The Look o f Medicine. The Look o f Carpentry. The Look o f Sex. Etc72 .
Why, particularly, is my focus on the visual culture o f mathematics, and why is singling
out anything in post-postmodem modernity and saying “It is notable that this thing can be
art if you frame it thusly” still an interesting thing to do? Has it not been done, back in
1917, by Duchamp, with his “R. Mutt” urinal?
The answer and admission, in part, is that it is not interesting. The sort o f trans
historicity and trans-linearity that Duchamp opened up was destructive, and an early
manifestation of the postmodern impulse or instinct. The evolution o f art, in some sense,
stopped in 1917; after someone says “Anything can be art,” and people actually listen, the
term “art” is no good anymore. Perhaps the real realization is that the term was no good
to begin with; unlike math, which is 5000 years old, “art” is only a few hundred.73 Before
then, people who drew, painted, or sculpted did so in a larger cultural context; “art for
art’s sake” was a conceptual seed that grew into something that has ultimately become
self-destructive. This is what some theorists are alluding to when they refer to the avantgarde as a “failed project.”74
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So, to say “This thing can be art” is not a novel or interesting concept in and of
its e lf- at least not anymore. What is interesting (I think), is when we start looking at the
things themselves and examining the particularities that emerge from their being re
contextualized as “art,” or perhaps as a material in culture we had not encountered in
such a way before. So, what if we really were to look at The Look o f Carpentry? It might
involve displaying some hand tools and nailed-together planks of wood, which is similar
to some exhibits I have seen. Yes, anything can be art - this is old news, and pointing it
out makes me sound as though I must have slept through art history.
Clearly, I would hope that the focus of this paper has not been a Duchampian
musing o f “But what is art, really?,” but instead, that it is seen as a close examination of
what happens, culturally and visually, when the look o f math - a page o f donemathematics - is proverbially tacked up on the gallery wall, and then split into signifier
and referent. Tacking the math up in the first place is not that interesting or brilliant or
revolutionary; “anything can be art” is not a concept that needs reiteration in the year
2011, and I hope I have not reiterated it too much. Although “math-as-art” implies a
novelty o f making math into art, my intellectual focus has always been Saussurean math structured as sign and object, as signifier and referent, and then the beginnings o f an
exploration o f what happens when that structure is pulled apart.
In a sense, my arguments are more about what can be taken away from math than
what can be added to art. Art has already been consumed by postmodernism and is
therefore in a fractured, trans-historical place that blocks research o f its continued linear
evolution. But math has not been similarly infected (except arguably by Godel and his
*J C

Incompleteness Theorem , which does not generalize to all math), which leaves it open
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for the central thrust o f my explorations: that you can take away the utility of math and be
left with some referent-less symbology, which is then ripe for re-assignment.
In closing this discussion, I need to more directly navigate the minefield I entered:
why (the visuality o f ethno)math? Why not, as I somewhat facetiously suggested, The
Look o f Carpentry? Because math has special qualities. Math has intellectual clout, it is
respected, and it is a symbol of the cult o f intelligence that flourishes in so many sectors
o f society, from the white-collar workplace to academia to internet communities. There is
a robustness to mathematics, a strength, and “not only truth, but supreme beauty - a
beauty cold and austere, like that o f sculpture, without appeal to any part o f our weaker
nature, without the gorgeous trappings o f paintings or music, yet sublimely pure and
capable o f a stem perfection such as only the greatest art can show.”76
Math intimidates many people77, and without a rigorous sociological study I am
willing to bet that a disproportionate number o f those people are artists. This harkens to
my discussion of the humanities-science split in intellectual culture, and furthermore, to
the fact that science has been artificially elevated over the humanities in part by the
interplay of capitalism, militarism, and nationalism. But I am inclined to think this split is
not entirely cultural, however politically incorrect it might be to allude to absolutes or
biological causation in human behavior. There exist some polymaths78 who can do both
math and art equally well, but most people are better at one or the other. So, because
math constitutes particularly foreign, perhaps particularly intimidating territory for artists
and art culture, it thereby and therefore constitutes particularly important territory for
artists and art culture.
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Math is drawing. This is not to imply that because math is bonded to a pencil-andpaper culture that it should automatically enjoy special art status, but only that the
historical import o f drawing as a discipline is strong enough that something as obviously
similar as the art o f doing mathematics appropriates some of that historical import, and in
doing so can more readily assume a comfortable place in art culture.
Lastly, the most important answer to “What is the importance of what you are
doing?” is quite personal; I have a relationship with the discipline o f math, which at this
point is over 10 years old and is fading fast from my more active neuro-chemical
structures. In order to get some of it back, some of that sense o f mastery and
accomplishment and in fact visual fulfillment I gained when I was doing math so many
years ago, I chisel at it now with a new toolbox. I remember the visuality o f math feeling
compelling, interesting, and important when I took math classes, and I know (and knew,
to an extent) that what I was doing was as much “art” as it was math.
I will summarize my main argument, although there are admittedly some (the
preceding pages’ worth of) important addendums to consider: if you pay attention to the
way math looks when it is written out, you can experience it on this visual level without
working with or understanding the logical content; math has a look, which is not the same
thing as m ath’s inner structure. Furthermore, separating the image o f some-thing from
that thing’s inner essence, structure, or nature allows new structures to seep in to the
empty form, and in turn affect both the observation of that form and our understanding of
the complexity o f human culture.
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Notes of Interest, Elaboration, and Reference

7 û

1During my undergraduate study of art, I was taught that Marcel Duchamp was a kind of
revolutionary, mythical figure - something like the art world’s version of Lance Armstrong in cycling; an
end-all and be-all. It was almost as if his importance could not be overstated. I suspect that this is close to
true, at least in a contemporary historical context - i.e., we are where we are now in academic, gallery and
museum-based art, and continue to exist where we are now, because of Duchamp’s ideas about
conceptualism. I say this with some reservations; I’m not all glowing praises for Duchamp and his ideas,
because I think they were destructive and nihilistic in the same ways that postmodernism has turned out to
be for any and all creative disciplines to which it attaches itself.
That said, I think we’re stuck - especially in academia - in a sort of conceptual soup that Duchamp
originally cooked up, and that we can’t swim our way out of (although he himself swam out of it, as I
mentioned in the introduction to this paper - he went off to play chess in Argentina instead of continuing
with “art”). Ultimately, postmodern conceptualism is stifling, and is probably going to end up hurting art in
the long run, in terms of its development and evolution. In fact it has to hurt it, because the effect of the
“Duchampian Revolution” was to stop the evolution of art, in a very postmodern way: we have nowhere to
go now, since everything has “been done.”
And I don’t think this is a good place to be - it’s turned the discipline of art into something destructively
“meta;” we can think now about the discipline of art and about how it’s not going anywhere, while we
borrow our vocabularies from 20th century continental philosophers like Derrida, Foucault, Lacan, Lyotard,
Bathes, etc, but I’m not sure we can really “study art” anymore, at least not in the same way that students in
the music department “study music.” Imagine people training to be plumbers being interrupted in their
learning the techniques of plumbing by time spent learning the philosophy of plumbing. Perhaps we should
be more like musicians, who devote 4 years of college study to being better musicians. “Total craft
immersion” is something that’s being left to the filmmakers and comic book artists, while the skill-sets of
artists in academia deteriorate to a point where they only make conceptual art, minimalism, and postmodern
smashed-together pastiche, not because they want to, but because they aren’t able to do anything else. In art
departments, we study to be conceptual pranksters, but not only that - we study to be the same conceptual
prankster, whose pranks were all pulled off almost 100 years ago.
This is not to say that conceptualism and craft are necessarily antithetical - indeed, it is my hope that they
are, or can be, complimentary. But it seems that they often amount to an oppositional dichotomy that can
readily be misinterpreted as a “one or the other” rhetorical trap, when really the best thing for students to do
is to make work that they like and that they’re excited about.
Notably, I begin and end this essay with Duchamp, in spite of or because of these misgivings.
2 Math is short for mathematics. I use the two words interchangeably and with no analytical
determination; “whichever sounds good” comes close to my methodology. Same goes for
ethnomath(ematics).
3 Although Duchamp’s place in “the art world” was virtually eliminated in 1918 by his own hand
when he moved to South America, his creative projects continued, whether or not these bore the label “art.”
His influence on the intersection of art and intellectual culture continued during the course of his life, and
irrespective of his moving in the appropriate cultural circles of the visual arts per se, especially as they were
more restrictively defined in the earlier and middle parts of the 20th century.
4 Alice Goldfarb Marquis. Marcel Duchamp: The Bachelor Stripped Bare : A Biography (Ann
Arbour: MFA Publications, 2002).
5 Pierre Cabanne. Dialogues with Marcel Duchamp (London: Thames and Hudson, 1971).
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6 “Visuality” refers to the seeable properties of an object, taken apart from other sensory
experience. For example, the visuality of a musical concert might include the color of the seats, the
hairstyle of the conductor, and the facial expressions on the violinists as they play. The visuality of a film
refers only to photons reflecting off the screen and onto the viewer’s retina (and specifically not the
soundtrack). The visuality of the entire “film experience” might also include spotting a chewed piece of
bubblegum stuck to the theatre floor. Finally, the visuality of math refers to the quality of there being a part
of the math that you can see, and that does not necessarily have anything to do with any other properties of
the math (such as the functioning of its logical intemalities).
7 The Shroud of Turin is a piece of material said by some to be imprinted with the image of the
crucified Christ. So, a “mathematical Shroud of Turin” would imply that the image of the math has been
imprinted, but the math itself has rolled the stone away from the tomb, so to speak. Daniel C. Scavone. The
Shroud O f Turin: Opposing Viewpoints. (Farmington Hills: Greenhaven Press, 1969).
s In his most important work on aesthetics, 19th century philosopher Clive Bell gives us the notion
of “significant form,” which he describes as some essential quality in formalism that is responsible, via an
individual phenomenology, for the subjective experience of art, as art. The notion certainly borders on the
mystical, and is reminiscent of a more-academic definition of “beauty,” although with less of a valuejudgment attached. Clive Bell. Art (Charleston: BiblioBazaar, LLC, 2008), 15-32.
9 Doris Schattschneider, Maurits Comelis Escher, Michele Emmer. M.C. Escher's Legacy: A
Centennial Celebration (New York: Springer, 2005), 142.
10 Ibid., 142.
11 Michael Emmer. The Visual Mind II (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 11.
12 Saussure, Ferdinand de. Course in General Linguistics (trans. Roy Harris) (London: Duckworth,
[1916] 1983). Although the Course was scientifically important in the early and middle parts of the 20th
century, other theorists and methodologies eventually supplanted it as a tool in linguistics. "Saussure's
views are not held, so far as I know, by modem linguists, only by literary critics, Lacanians, and the
occasional philosopher" (Holland, Norman N. (1992) The Critical I, Columbia University Press). Perhaps it
is the tendency of the postmodern to cling to outdated science, even as it presents a critique of science.
13 Ubiratan D'Ambrosio, a Brazillian educator, coined the term in 1977, and admitted that the
meaning was never straightforward.
14 Allen J. Bishop. Second International Handbook o f Mathematics Education, Volume 1 (New
York: Springer, 2003), 82.
15 Arthur B. Powell, Marilyn Frankenstein. Ethnomathematics: Challenging Eurocentrism in
Mathematics Education (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997), 6.
16 Helaine Selin, Ubiratan D'Ambrosio. Mathematics Across Cultures: the History o f Non-Western
Mathematics (New York: Springer, 2001), 18.
17 Anthropology is the formal, often academic study of human culture and human behavior. So, I
find it appropriate to term my flavor of ethnomathematics as an anthropological ethnomathematics; in fact,
something like “the anthropology of mathematics” might be even clearer, except there are some
connotation to that which might be better avoided; the line between ethnography and anthropology is a fine
one (as is the line between anthropology and sociology - or perhaps I should say these are particularly fine
lines, as any two intellectual disciplines inevitably enjoy a plane of intersection), with “anthropology”
connoting, at least to me, a comparative study of culture across time and geography while ethnography
connotes the analysis of a particular culture. So, then, ethnography of mathematics? Sociology of
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mathematics? I think any of these would work, as long as the central idea of “the study of the culture of
mathematics” enjoys focus. And, in fact, differentiating between ethnography, sociology, and anthropology
isn’t really a useful practice when it comes to my studio research, since that research is not all that specific
or limited in scope; it is artwork, after all, and tends to go where it will go, so to speak.
18

I want to approach the second possible definition of ethnomathematics that is currently used in
contemporary scholarship, only because it is in common use and I want to ensure that my work does not
fall under its umbrella. When some writers mention ethnomathematics, they are referring specifically to
any mathematical system that is non-Western, and in doing so are committing the same error that an
anthropologist might when he talks about “ethnic” practices applying only to uncontacted tribes in New
Guinea and the shape of their arrowheads, rather than the more familiar activity of someone in the
anthropologist’s home town visiting a convenience store and buying a hot dog.
Used in this way, scholarship can appear to function as a tool that demonstrates power and establishes itself
in a high-up place within a political or cultural hierarchy. This is a common phenomenon, in psychology as
well as in sociology - part of the appeal of a psychiatric diagnosis is that in making it the subject is turned
into a lab rat and thereby made less. The necessary power relationship between experimenter and subject,
such as in the case of a biologist establishing controls for his or her experiments on rats or fruit flies,
presents an inherent danger in some areas of sociology or anthropology. In fact, the phrase “establishing
controls for experimentation” is a good clue as to the inherent power relationships present in science and
extant between experimenter and subject. When the subject is an aspect of human culture (as in the case of
sociology or anthropology) or the human mind (as in the case of psychology) then the situation becomes
political.
Although any cultural practice of mathematics can fall under “ethnomathematics,” when Western scholars
use the term they are often talking about non-Western math. Furthermore, by using the term
“ethnomathematics” Western anthropologists are in danger of devaluing the mathematical systems of other
cultures by describing them as being primitive and not “real” mathematics, even though a given nonWestem system might work just as effectively at solving problems within its containing culture as the math
within Western culture works at solving its problems (i.e., building jet fighters or establishing controls for
physical experiments).
It has been remarked, often within a Marxist framework or discourse, that “all is politics,” and by
implication that trying to shut out or suppress the inherent political considerations that inevitably arise from
a variety of discussions amounts to “intellectual fascism.” Recognizing this, and furthermore agreeing with
the basic principle (that “politics,” defined as human power relationships, is inevitable, and purposefully
ignoring it functions as a tool of de-politicization, a process which disenfranchises the population and keeps
power in the hands of a ruling elite), my resistance to this politicized definition of ethnomathematics is
bom of the fact that it could turn my project in a direction away from aesthetics. So, I use the term
“ethnomath” as a way of talking about mathematical practices apart from internal structures, and most
crucially, as a thing that will give rise to a visual culture which can be approached as art by an observer.
Ultimately, the problem I am pointing to here can be boiled down to the fact that “ethnomathematics” could
be used both to describe something that, in postmodern language, could be called neocolonialism, and also
to describe the culture of math.
There is an ethnicity and an ethnology inherent in conventional notions of Western mathematics: it has
been described as “white male mathematics,” and some people, especially those in math and in the
sciences, think the very notion of the term is nonsense, or even offensive, dishonest, or harmful, reasoning
from the standpoint of “ 1 + 1 = 2 , regardless of what gender and race you self-report as.” Arguing against
the existence of white male mathematics is easy: because Western mathematics works to achieve goals like
building the aforementioned jet fighters or establishing the aforementioned controls of physical
experimentation, Western mathematics itself appears to argue that it is the only way to do mathematics i.e., it works. However, it is important to remember that the goals of Western applied mathematics are not
the same as the goals associated with systems like Vedic math in India, or Yoruba mathematics in Africa -
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these systems also work to solve culture-specific problems, and in that sense they are a correct system for
that given culture (whereas Western mathematics would not be, in those cases).
Arguing that there might be something of value to be gained from to the term “white male mathematics” is
not difficult either. As I noted above, Western math does not have to constitute the only kind of math,
because the applied math of other cultures are designed to solve different problems than the ones Western
math solves. Furthermore, those doing Western math over the centuries from Plato to Leibniz to Poincare
to Perelman have been white and male (although not necessarily Western, as the last and many other
examples demonstrate). This is in itself an ethnomathematical argument, or perhaps even a realist
argument: because white males were (and often still are) the ones doing the math, this supersedes an
argument that the math somehow transcends human subjectivity. Simply put, Western mathematics is
obviously equated with “white male mathematics,” because white males constituted, up until perhaps very
recently, the overwhelming majority of the ones doing the mathematics.
19 Mark Balageur. Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics (New York: Oxford University
Press US, 2001).
20 Kulturkampf- “Culture War”. Origins are 19th century German church vs. state struggles.
21 National Science Foundation Authorization Act of 2007: Report. DIANE Publishing.
22 The degree to which “right-brained” and “left-brained” are either real, physical divisions of
labor performed by the brain, or cultural metaphors for splitting up our realities with that same “Derridean
Binary” format I keep mentioning, which probably is bom of our bilateral symmetry (two eyes, two arms,
two legs, etc), is not agreed-upon. However, directions in brain science seem to imply that things are not as
“clear cut,” in terms of particular areas of the brain being tasked exclusively with particular cognitive
assignments, as we thought 50 or even 20 years ago. So, it is with this in mind that I use the terms “right
brained” and “left-brained”. It is not my intent to promote a reactionary, reductionist world-view - one that
excessively maps A to B in what might be called an overly-mathematical approach to metaphysics - but
only to (or perhaps mostly to) employ a cultural metaphor, which I am explaining as well as helping to
create. In other words, the subject of my studies is in part about the division of intellectual reality into “left
brained” and “right brained” enterprises, and why this division takes place; it’s not really about confirming
the existence of something carved in stone (or perhaps grey matter).
\

23 Quantum gravity attempts to reconcile quantum mechanics with general relativity.
24 Alan D. Sokal. The Sokal Hoax: The Sham That Shook the Academy. (Lincoln: U. of Nebraska
Press, 2000).
25 John McCumber. Philosophy and Freedom: Derrida, Rorty, Habermas, Foucault
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 44.
26 The “irrational rationality of capitalism” is Michel Foucault’s phrase, which is often used in a
slightly wider context than intended to associate sci-tech disciplines with the financial interests of the ruling
class. In the essay from which this phrase is taken, Foucault used it specifically in reference to Weberian
economics. In capitalist economic theory, concepts like “perfect competition” are used to illustrate the
mechanical, dispassionate workings of the free market, as though it were reducible to a perfectly
predictable or controllable machine. While this is certainly not the case, as has been demonstrated by
events like stock market crashes, it is notable that Marxist economics is also sometimes described as a
science, showing us that the borrowing of rationality or logic to justify some political ends is not an
exclusive sin of ffee-market fascism. Michel Foucault, Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, Peter Miller (Ph.
D.). The Foucault Effect: Studies In Governmentality : With Two Lectures By And An Interview With
Michel Foucault (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1991), 78.
27 Einstein, of course, was a Swiss patent clerk who did theoretical physics in his spare time.
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28 Perleman was similar. He lived with his mother in near obscurity in Russia, and refused the
Fields medal on the grounds that he “didn’t need it.”
29 “Anti-realism” is the proposition that there is no objective reality, a template or set of ideas
against which actuality can be judged. Nietzsche wrote extensively on anti-realism, and was one of its most
famous proponents. Plato, on the other hand, was a realist, notably in his philosophy of mathematics.
Conversely, a realist position asserts the existence of such a template, and often carries with this assertion
connotations of extant divinity, since nothing else could produce an ideal against which all naturallyoccurring phenomena might be judged and measured.
30 T. Koetsier, Luc Bergmans. Mathematics and the Divine: a Historical Study, Volume 2004 (San
Diego: Elesvier, 2005), 79.
31 Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie, David R. Fideler. The Pythagorean Sourcebook and Library: an
Anthology o f Ancient Writings (Grand Rapids: Phanes Press, 1987), 52.
32 David Oliver. The Shaggy Steed o f Physics: Mathematical Beauty in the Physical World (New
York: Springer, 2004), 18.
33 Steve Awodey. Category Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 1.
34 James Roy Newman. The World o f Mathematics, Volume 3 (New York: Courier Dover
Publications, 2000), 1871.
35

Willem Kuyk. Complementarity in Mathematics: A First Introduction to the Foundations o f
Mathematics and Its History (New York: Springer, 1977), 71.
36 David E. Radford, Fernando José Oliveira Souza, David N. Yetter. Diagrammatic Morphisms
and Applications: AMS Special Session on Diagrammatic Morphisms in Algebra, Category Theory, and
Topology, October 21-22, 2000, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, California, Volume 2000
(Providence: AMS Bookstore, 2003), 1.
37 Giandomenico Sica. What Is Category Theory? Volume 3 o f Advanced Studies In Mathematics
And Logic (Milan: Polimetrica s.a.s., 2006), 222.
38

David E. Radford, Fernando José Oliveira Souza, David N. Yetter. Diagrammatic Morphisms
and Applications: AMS Special Session on Diagrammatic Morphisms in Algebra, Category Theory, and
Topology, October 21-22, 2000, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, California, Volume 2000
(Providence: AMS Bookstore, 2003), vii.
39 Daniel Perrin. Algebraic Geometry: an Introduction (New York: Springer, 2008), 20.
40 H. E. Huntley. The Divine Proportion: A Study In Mathematical Beauty (Mineola: Courier
Dover Publications, 1970).
41Jerry P. King. The Art o f Math (New York: Plenum Press, 1992), 284.
42 Wikipedia, perhaps now close to universally known as a free-content, publically-editable
encyclopedia, has been cited to illustrate that when “mathematical beauty” is popularly defined or
described, it is often accompanied by some graphic illustration to emphasize the point of “beauty,” even
though “mathematical beauty” does not necessarily have a direct relationship with visuality. Wikipedia
contributors, “Mathematical Beauty,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Mathematical_beauty&oldid=359408327. Citing or using
Wikipedia has become such a cultural bugbear in academia that I felt I had to justify my actions somehow.
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43 H. E. Huntley. The Divine Proportion: A Study in Mathematical Beauty (Mineola: Courier
Dover Publications, 1970), 143.
44 Paul J. Nahin. Dr. Euler's Fabulous Formula: Cures Many Mathematical Ills (Princeton:
Princeton U. Press, 2006), 3.
45 A “shear injury” is kind of brain injury that comes about when a sharply rotated brain-case
causes the brain to twist against itself, severing neurons as they are rapidly over-stretched. Shear injuries
are common in motor pedestrian incidents (people getting hit by cars).
46 When someone talks about “my brain” or “my body,” an obvious metaphysical issue is raised:
what or who is the “me” in “my brain” or “my body”? A soul, maybe? A pre-scientific concept, I think (as
might even be “mind”). So is this a relic of a language that has not kept pace with the evolution of science?
Or perhaps it’s something deeper: a notion of some universal consciousness? Does it have spiritual
implications?
47 Centre for Educational Research and Innovation, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development. Understanding The Brain: The Birth O f A Learning Science, Volume 2. (OECD Publishing,
2007), 114.
4XI say “tautological” because God is, in some sense, the only thing that can truly be perfect, and
true perfection is a quality that can only exist in God.
49 William James set out his definition of a mystical experience to be that which is couched in
individual experience, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mysticism/
50 The other spiritual/religious/mystical experience (SRME), or at least the big one that will
always stand in my memory, was about five years earlier, at the age of 18, in the St. Mary’s River in St.
Mary’s County, Maryland, United States. I had overdosed on Ritalin, a common anti-attention deficit
disorder medication that had been prescribed to me, and my thoughts and feelings under the influence of
the massive dosage centered on a feeling of contentment with the remarkable wholeness and perfection of
all reality, as well as the comforting knowledge that “everything was going to be all right.” It was similar to
my experience of learning trigonometry in that during both instances I felt an emotionally powerful, sudden
grasp of understanding (or apprehension, perhaps) of “reality.” In both cases, it all made sense, or perhaps
all came together.
51 People working in science and technology frequently make use of the phrase “trivial” or “non
trivial” to describe something that does not (or does) affect a given field of experiment or production.
Recently, other people have started to use the word to sound smart - it has crept into casual conversation.
See: note 47, “hand-wavy.”
52 In undergraduate math programs, “analysis” (of complex and/or real numbers) is usually the last
category of courses a student needs to take for degree completion. The first courses in calculus, for which
courses in algebra are a preparation, are themselves a preparation and introduction to Mathematical
Analysis. Analysis itself is loosely defined as a “deep” study of calculus, where the fundamental principles
and theorems of measurement of dynamic quantities are solidified. Jonathan Lewin. An Interactive
Introduction to Mathematical Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press, 2003), 5.
53 Frank Morgan. Calculus Lite (Wellesley: A.K. Peters, 1995), 10. Along with providing me with
a list o f differentiation rules, this was the textbook I used to review my calculus skills, and with which I
was able to produce an organic drawing developed from doing math (as opposed to copying math).
Hopefully I’m able to do more of these “drawings” formally developed from the visual artifacts of math,
partly because they would support my thesis better, and partly because they are more vital, more alive, and
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more original than an abstract composition of subconsciously-derived shapes and forms, which is then
augmented with a few lines of algebra.
54 Sometimes two given objects will satisfy a given definition; in these cases, they are referred to
as being “isomorphic” with respect to that given definition. For instance, the number 1 satisfies the
definition of "a square root of 1”, since the square of 1 is 1. But in fact there is another number that satisfies
the same definition, namely -1, since -1 times -1 is 1. Thus, 1 and -1 are distinct objects that are isomorphic
with respect to the definition “the square root o f 1.” This illustrates how the delineation between objects
can sometimes be blurred. Email conversation with Dr. Michael Misamore. London Ontario and Kingston
Ontario, August 4th, 2010.
55 Roger Penrose, bom in 1931, was a British mathematical physicist who created string diagrams
(which bear his name) in order to better describe the causal relationships between different points in space
and time.
56 David E. Radford, Fernando José Oliveira Souza, David N. Yetter. Diagrammatic Morphisms
and Applications: AMS Special Session on Diagrammatic Morphisms in Algebra, Category Theory, and
Topology, October 21-22, 2000, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, California, Volume 2000
(Providence: AMS Bookstore, 2003), 10.
57 Ibid, 3.
58 “Handy-wavy” is a term usually restricted to use by mathematicians and scientists, but is one
that I find useful. It usually characterizes an imprecise and un-rigorous explanation of something, such that
someone attempting it would tend to wave his hands around a lot. It can also refer to concepts themselves,
which might be impossible to convey, describe, or define in a precise way. Its usage in an MFA thesis is a
bit ironic, considering how much literal hand-waving some artists do when they talk about their work.
Unlike “non-trivial” (see: note 64), “hand-wavy” has not, in my observation, (yet?) made its way into a
cultural context larger than science, math, and technology, but I think this larger cultural context is ripe for
the assimilation.
59 Strictly defined, intelligence might be something like G, or “general intelligence,” a value that
closely tracks a given IQ score. But often intelligence is defined in terms of other mental abilities.
However, according to the strict lexicon of a psychometrician, “intelligence” is mostly the ability to
recognize patterns and solve problems.
60 This, I believe, was one of Derrida’s points: that the sort of primitive, dualistic world-view that
permeates Western culture is harmful to intellectual, personal, and spiritual growth. In other words, he
didn’t just point out the existence of the binary structure with one of its components politically elevated
above the other, but went on to say “this is not a good way to go about the machinations of reality.”
Without reading (and understanding) a lot of Derrida, it’s difficult to know just how his concept of the
binary structure in the way we perceive and subdivide reality into language categories differs from dualism,
which has been criticized by enlightened Westerners like Nietzsche (in Beyond Good and Evil).
61 Duchamp invented “retinal art” as a derisive term to describe art that was conceptually barren.
62 Duchamp, M., Notes, Champs Flammarion- Center D'art Et De Culture Georges Pompidou,
Paris, 1999.
63 The question of competence is a repeatedly arising concern, although not one that is rigorously
pertinent to the main idea of this thesis. Instead of leaving out the subject of my and my audience’s
qualifications to present and receive mathematics, I will discuss it here. The issue presents itself in the form
of two questions.
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First of all, am I qualified to work with math? Do I have some kind of math background? Do I understand
what I am putting down? To some extent, I will say “yes.” I probably have more background in math than
most people, but this background amounts to nothing beyond a year of calculus, which is not uncommon.
“Am I qualified?” is an interesting question to ask considering the context, because this project is largely
about taking the math away from math; it is about the way people react to these remaining marks on paper,
and also simply what these marks look like. Perhaps I should avoid saying, "simply what they look like",
because it is impossible for something as clearly semiotic as math not to have any meaning attached to it.
But whether or not I understand the math's original, logical functioning is mostly a moot question. I say
“mostly” because in a few of my drawings, the formal elements are actually composed of "done
mathematics". One of my favorites, for personal as well as project-related reasons, is a drawing in
preparation for which I was able to do a self-study refresher course on my 10 year-old calculus skills and
take a few derivatives on drawing paper.
At one point I thought questions like "Do you understand this?" revealed something about the social
location of math, which is something I write about. I mean this in the sense of reading this between the
lines of the question: “Do you, an artist, understand this great and difficult thing you're making a spectacle
of? Are you good enough to do so? ” But now, I have come to think questions on whether or not I
understand math are based on the semiotic nature of what I am putting down; if I were to write down
Spanish or Korean or French, I might be asked "Do you understand Spanish or Korean or French?", and I
do not think such a question would be motivated from any position of suspicion of lack of qualifications; it
would simply be a natural reaction to any signifier: what is the signified?
Secondly, “Is the audience qualified to look at my work?” This might be the more interesting of these two
sub-questions into which I have divided the question of competence, and a large portion of my work deals
with it. To answer, I will say that my re-positioning of mathematical symbols for re-assignment of new
meaning is perhaps dependent on my audience not being qualified to look at my artwork. The only thing I
ask of my audience is that they have some kind of relationship with math, which I know most people do.
However, it is possible that taking the mathematical guts away from the math is something that happens in
the process of my executing an art project, and even those people who might understand a lot of the math
will replace the mathematical meaning with something else.
64 This is a huge topic, and one that is of some interest to me - in doing these math drawings, I’ve
become tainted by the trappings of abstract painting, which is a large area with its own discourse. How is it
possible to write theory on abstract image-making? Does it mean that it is all necessarily relegated to the
enormous category of the subconscious, or are there some other possibilities there? I mention “an
observer’s feelings on abstract art” in a sort of meta-reflexive way, but I am sure there are more
possibilities. One other that occurred to me later on is a sort of self-reflection and turning inward towards a
total state of introspection and introversion (which is related to considerations of the subconscious, in a
Freudian or non-Freudian sense), as one works on and focuses on these “meaningless” formal elements.
The process is sort of like grooming yourself in the mirror.
65 Ralph, Bill. “Bill Ralph's Art From Mathematics.” http://billralph.com/ (accessed June 1, 2010).
66 Further reading: Wikibooks Conributors, LaTeX (Printellegra Company, 2008).
http://bit.ly/dYg5k8 (redirect to Google Books)
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There is such a thing as “mathematical formalism,” which is a position in the philosophy of
math holding that mathematical statements are valid only as the consequences of symbolic manipulation. If
we divide art up into conceptualism (art of the mind) and formalism (art of the eye), then there are some
parallels there, most notably in the lack of “depth” common to both mathematical and artistic formalism.
For all intents and purposes mathematical formalism can be regarded as the same thing as mathematical
anti-realism, a concept which I have brought up many times in this essay. However, in order to avoid
confusion with aesthetic formalism, I use the term “anti-realism” or “anti-Platonism.”
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68 If someone is concerned with pure math, one might expect him to expand pi out to somewhere
far beyond three decimal places. But, since this particular number (3.142) indicates a pitch, we are stuck in
a physical realm where expansion even beyond the first decimal place (or perhaps even the difference
between two sequential whole numbers) is insignificant, according to its interpretation by human ear. In
short, show me someone who can hear the difference between 314.1 hertz and 314.2 hertz, and I’ll show
you a robot. This fact seems to function simultaneously as ethnomathematics and its opposite, whatever
that might be called.
69

Postmodernism is relevant to everything we do, because it has seeped into and affects
everything we do. The main concepts of postmodernism are, I think, alluded to in its name:
"postmodernism." How can something come after that which is modem? Well, obviously it can't. So, with
postmodernism, we've broken the linearity of historical evolution, and all forms, all styles, all end-states are
simultaneously occurring. In a postmodern world view, you can no longer say "Here is x, and x maps
directly to y", because just what x and y are is not clearly defined, much less the relationship of x to y.
70 The date of Duchamp’s Fountain, which was an autographed urinal placed in a gallery.
71 “The everyday” is an important concept in contemporary art, and although it might be
presumptuous to try and explain it in a single endnote (especially without a good background in LeFebvre
and the Situationists - The Everyday vs. the everyday), I will anyway: the term is contemporarily and
ahistorically most useful in relation to the “anything can be art” paradigm shift of the early 20th century and
the “total aesthetic environment” that came up around us slowly with the dawn of civilization. In our
T.A.E., everything we see around us is designed, embossed, produced or manufactured - essentially,
everything is beautiful by Neolithic standards.
Consider the film “The Gods Must Be Crazy,” in which an African tribesman finds a Coke bottle on the
ground that had dropped out of an airplane. This is immediately regarded as the most beautiful (and useful)
object the tribe has ever seen. But, it is not remarkable to us (although it certainly is, compared to rocks and
wood and even the “unfinished” home-stitched clothing of the middle ages) because everything around us
looks this way: we live in an age of super-design. So, if everything around us is art and nothing is worth
looking at, and then we hear Duchamp et al saying “anything can be art,” the next step is to regard the nonbeautiful as art, and to use our powers of perception to transform anything into art.
If our physical environment has been destroyed by Capitalism and industry, the only choice is to use our
powers of meditation and draw some arbitrary object - let’s say a urinal - out of the realm of “the
everyday,” and turn it into art.
72 My original title was Ethnomathematics, Mysticism, and Representation: The Phenomenology
o f M ath’s Visual Culture. Really, the focus was “ethnomathematics.” “Representation” got put in because
the thesis was and is about visual art (or, specifically, the visuality of math). “Mysticism,” on the other
hand, was a little harder to justify and was a relic of some designs I had earlier in my residence in UWO’s
MFA program, when I wanted to do art and thesis-work related to “spirituality,” without a good
understanding of just how ill-defined that term is. “Phenomenology” is the pet philosophical lapdog of the
visual arts, since it refers to a world view built from individual sensory experiences - tailor-made, if you
will.
Ultimately, I ended up lifting out a considerable number (5-10) pages on mysticism (my answer to the
fuzziness of the term “spirituality” - mysticism has a bit more academic clout, at least, and some library
literature behind it), and I feel that my thesis is better for it. That said, I don’t want to imply that mysticism
has no place in mathematics, ethnomathematics, or visual art. In fact, it might be a sort of binding glue that
holds all of these together. However, the problem with writing about mysticism is that it’s very hard not to
have your analyses sound very general. One could take “mysticism” and throw it into just about any text
and (perhaps) convincingly argue that it has a necessary, vital place in the thesis. And it might - the nature
of mysticism might be that it does have a necessary and vital place in any argument. But this kind of
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“everything is everything” thought makes for sloppy academics and sloppy prose, and it starts to become
detrimental to making sense and sounding sufficiently non-crazy.
My second title was Ethnomathematics and Visual Culture, but I abandoned that because it sounds
pompous and abstruse, and “visual culture” has become a tired buzzword. The Look o f Math is, I think,
refreshing and accurate.
73 When I say “art is only a few hundred years old,” I mean “art” as in “art for art’s sake” - art that
is focused on itself, certainly after the advent of Modernism in the 19th century and perhaps even during and
after the Renaissance. Certainly, say, Chinese calligraphy and Egyptian tomb hieroglyphics are thousands
of years old, and although it’s impossible to read the minds of those artisans, there exists a historiographical
consensus that the focus of these projects was some purpose outside of their creation, in and of itself.
74 Peter Bürger, Michael Shaw. Theory o f the Avant-Garde (Manchester: Manchester U. Press ND,
1984), 57.
75 I’ve been curious for some time about how Postmodernism might have affected mathematics
(or, at least how it might be reflected in mathematics), and Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem is the best
example I can come up with. It is my understanding that the theorem is frequently misquoted and
misunderstood, especially by people seeking to draw literary metaphors from it, which is something we see
in other areas like chaos theory (“you can’t predict this thing, no matter how hard you try”), the Heisenberg
uncertainty principle (“you can’t observe this thing without affecting this thing”), and various
interpretations of quantum mechanics (usually something to do with free will vs. determinism). In all of
these cases, people “in the humanities” draw from incomplete or just wrong understandings of these
scientific ideas, metaphors or philosophical notions that apply to some aspect of reality. And while the
lessons in the metaphors might not be wrong, per se, it is still based on a skewed notion of a given scientific
idea, which is something that tends to annoy scientists.
The metaphor that one might draw out of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem is, basically, that the truths we
cling to are ultimately subjective, and cannot be shown to be otherwise inside of the same universe - that
we’re locked inside of a small room with arbitrary rules and properties, and that the “universality” of these
rules and properties is far from assured. This sounds to me like a very postmodern idea.
76 Attributed to Bertrand Russel.
77 “Math anxiety” is a “real” disorder that has been studied, measured, written about, treated, etc.
It is, perhaps obviously from its name, a problem that arises when students have an undue fear of
mathematics. This widespread intimidation by mathematics is another indicator of math’s social location.
Perhaps in 1910, when the tables were turned and the humanities were “elevated” over the sciences (at least
according to Bertrand Russel), people had “philosophy anxiety.”
78 “Polymath” is a word that has nothing per se to do with math, but rather refers to someone like
Leonardo Da Vinci, who defies or transcends the usual way in which people seem to be bom with mental
gifts that focus either on the quantitative or the artistic.
79

I enjoyed working with my endnotes, and they border on being nontraditional. For instance, the
first word in my thesis is "Duchamp”, a numbered reference referring to an endnote about Duchamp, which
is about 500 words long. A pattem is established, and I use my endnotes as kind of a "free writing zone"
where I can talk about and elaborate on topics at any length I want and in a more conversational style,
something that might interrupt the flow of the main body of text if the endnotes were folded into it.
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